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JURISDICTION 
This is a Petition for Review of agency action, and the Court 
has jurisdiction for appellate review of the agency action pursuant 
to Section 63-46b-16(1), Utah Code, together with Section 78-2a-
3(2) (a), Utah Code. See also, Rules 3, 4 and 14, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Industrial Commission have jurisdiction to enter 
any orders while the case was already on appeal? Correction of 
error standard, no deference. Hurley v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah Department of Employment Security, 
767 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). 
II. Assuming the Commission had jurisdiction, was the 
"filing" of ci Request for Reconsideration complete upon mailing? 
Correction of error (pure question of law), Hurley, supra; State v. 
Dickey, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utcih App. Nov. 3, 1992). 
III. Assuming it had jurisdiction, and further assuming that 
mailing the request was insufficient, did the Commission abuse its 
discretion in failing to grant a one business day extension to file 
Maverik's Request for Reconsideration? Abuse of discretion 
standard. 
IV. Has there ever been a final order from the Commission? 
Correction of error (pure question of law), Hurley, supra; Dickey, 
supra. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
All of these authorities, as well as certain key cases, are 
included in the Appendices (and are therefore not set forth 
verbatim here). Of particular help in determining this appeal are 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, relevant portions of which 
are included in the Appendix, 
Key authorities include Peters v. Peters, 394 P.2d 71 (Utah 
1964) (except in limited divorce situations, once a matter is 
appealed the lower tribunal loses jurisdiction to enter further 
orders)• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of Case. This appeal is a Request for Review of 
the orders of the Industrial Commission, and specifically the Order 
Denying Review issued on March 30, 1992. It is closely tied to a 
prior and still pending appeal of the same Industrial Commission 
case, Court of Appeals Docket Number 910413-CA. That other appeal 
has been fully briefed and is awaiting oral argument, to be held 
simultaneously with argument on this appeal. 
b. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Agency 
Level. The procedural history is as follows: 
* February 6, 1989 or earlier - McCord filed her claim with 
2 
the Division. Tr. 41, 42. Trial exhibit 3. 
* 1990-1991 - For some unexplained reason, the proceedings 
languish and are not actively prosecuted. 
* February 12, 1991 - "No cause determination" is written on 
an official file document, after the Division loses contact with 
McCord for a considerable while.1 
* February-March, 1991 - The Division's investigation ends 
with an opinion that Maverik engaged in handicap discrimination. 
* March, 1991 - Maverik requests a de novo hearing. 
* May 15, 1991 - Formal hearing is held. Afterward, the 
parties submitted written closing arguments. 
* June 26, 1991 - Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order issued by Antidiscrimination Division Administrative Law 
Judge Lisa Michelle-Church. Attached as Appendix A. Although the 
decision called itself "final", the ALJ requested that the parties 
submit evidence and arguments on attorney fees to aid her in a 
later determination of attorney fees. No dollar amount of back pay 
or other damage was stated. Appendix A. 
* July 26, 1991 - Maverik files in this Court its first 
Petition for Review, assigning error to those Findings, Conclusions 
1
 In Gregerson v. Board of Review, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 
21 (Utah App. Oct. 28, 1992), a five year delay was reason for 
reversal and remand for a new hearing, where the agency delay 
deprived the appeals court of a reviewable transcript. Here the 
matter has dragged on and on. Three years were consumed for the 
"investigation" alone. This, combined with the "no cause 
determination" reflected in the Commission file, should result in 
dismissal or reversal. Section 34-35-7.1(3)(b), Utah Code 
requires, "If no settlement is reached, the investigatory shall 
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in 
the request for agency action." Emphasis added. 
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and Order, See Docket Number 910413-CA. That appeal is ready for 
oral argument.2 
All of the events below occurred after the Appeal (Request for 
Review) was filed and this Court took jurisdiction. 
* August 10, 1991 - Since the agency continues to assume and 
act as if it had jurisdiction, Maverik requested an opportunity for 
discovery on reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs 
(totalling about $27,000) sought by McCord. 
* September 10, 1991 - ALJ issues Supplemental Order relating 
to attorney fees and costs. Appendix B. This order also claims to 
be "final", but still no amount of damages is determined or 
awarded• 
* October 10, 1991 - Maverik seeks Commission review of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and of the 
Supplemental Order. 
* February 28, 1992 - The Division issues its Order Denying 
Review, attached as Appendix C. In that order the Commission 
refused to examine its earlier orders, ruling that Maverik was one 
day tardy in its request for Commission reconsideration. Even 
though the first order asked for more information on attorney fees, 
the Commission treated the initial order (Appendix A) and the 
supplemental order regarding attorney fees (Appendix B) as two 
completely separate matters, each being a "final" order. 
The Commission held that because no request for agency review 
However, the Court has properly determined that these 
matters should be argued together after this one is ripe. 
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was filed within 30 days of the first order (an appeal to this 
Court was filed instead), it would not entertain reconsideration. 
It also refused to reconsider the second order, this time because 
Maverik mailed is request for agency review to the Commission on 
the 30th day (October 10, 1991) and it was not received by the 
Commission until the next business day (October 15, 1991). 
* March 19, 1992 - Maverik files its Request for 
Reconsideration of the February 2 6th Order Denying Review. 
Appendix D. Maverik pointed out that neither of the orders under 
consideration was final. Page 2. As a part of the request, 
Maverik moved for the one business day extension necessary to take 
away any question of timeliness. 
c Disposition at Agency Level. 
* March 30, 1992 - Commission issues its Order Denying 
Request for Reconsideration. Appendix E. This is primarily the 
order appealed from here. For the first time, the Commission 
reverses itself on the issue of finality: "Upon further review, we 
agree that the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue 
of attorney fees was reserved. ..." Page 2 (emphasis supplied). 
This is the order appealed from here. 
Despite this flip flop on finality, the agency still denied 
reconsideration because of alleged tardiness in requesting review 
of those two orders. 
* April 3, 1992 - Maverik files with the Commission its 
Limited Request for Reconsideration, setting forth the agency's 
5 
misunderstanding ot law and procedure. Appendix F. This request 
explains Maverik1s "good cause" for the one day extension. This 
request has not been ruled upon by the Commission. 
* April 6, 1992 - Maverik files its Petition for Writ of 
Review with this Court, which is this appeal. Appendix G. Maverik 
felt compelled to appeal the March 30th order, since the Commission 
called it Mike every prior order) "find I11, .m<l berause that aqemey 
has been inconsistent in its holdings and treatment of finality of 
orders and time limitations. 
a Statement of Relevant Facts. 3 
I • Background. Claimant Vickie McCord was employed for the 
first two weeks of October, 1988, is <i part-time (three six-hum 
shifts per week) convenience store cashier. Tr. 38, 52, 55. She 
states that she has a "mitral valve prolapse" i"MPV"), a very 
common and usually symptom-1 rep heart irregularity. Tr. 32, 34. 
However, there is no medical testimony in the record that she 
indeed has that condition. See, e.g., Tr. 33. McCord was "fine", 
and had n appreciable problems with the alleged MPV. Tr. 36, 47, 
48, 104, 108. 
Maverik manager Connie Jones interviewed and hired McCord. Tr. 
38, 54. On the job application McCord indicated she had no heart 
3
 The facts in this particular appeal are important mostly 
just for background, with the possible exception of those having 
to do with the alleged tardiness of a reconsideration request. 
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condition or life-threatening problem. Exhibit4 1, tr. 39, tr. 
146-147. 
There was evidence that McCord had trouble reading gas pumps 
and often smelled of alcohol on the job, but also that she did well 
at the till. Tr. 44, 45, 58, 62, Exhibit 3, 135-136. Maverik's 
employees testified that termination was not the result of a 
handicap or perceived handicap. 
McCord1s duties included cashier, stocker, janitorial, public 
contact and record-keeping, and sometimes she would be required to 
work alone in the store. Tr. 53, 64. 
On October 14, 1988 McCord was waiting on customers when she 
experienced agitation and chest discomfort while working a shift 
alone. Tr. 66-67. She told Jones for the first time about her 
MPV, and said that it frightened her. Tr. 68. McCord left for the 
emergency room, where she was checked and released. Tr. 68-71. 
The doctor released her to return to work. Tr. 71. 
Although the details and reasons are disputed, Jones 
terminated McCord later that day. Tr. 72-82. Jones indicated she 
had heart problems in her family. Id. She terminated McCord 
because, among other things, she said she felt uncomfortable 
leaving McCord alone to work such a stressful job, both physically 
and mentally. Tr. 79-82, 94, 95. Exhibit 4. The ALJ found that 
termination was because McCord had a handicap or perceived 
handicap. 
4
 References to "Exhibits" are to those introduced at the 
formal agency hearing of this matter. 
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McCord made some effort to look for work, Tr. 110-113, Exhibit 
but failed in several instances to follow up on nobs, Tr. 132-
133. She got a janitorial job at Ashley Elementary School a couple 
of weeks after she was fired by Maverik, where she worked for two 
months. Tr. 111. She earned more per hour and worked more hours 
per week than she had at Maverik Tr. Ill. Eventually she quit 
her new job because of an unspecified illness. ': - .12. 
McCord has no goal of being a convenience store clerk as a 
career. Tr. 132. At trial, she did not know the difference 
between full time and part ti me employ ment ., tr 157, and had no 
idea what she earned during the years for which she claims Maverik 
owes her wages (late 1988 through 1991). Tr. 258. McCord attended 
school, and testified that she expected to begi n working for the 
Forest Service. Tr. 158-159. 
2. Facts relating to timeliness. The Commission's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order5 on June 26, 1991, 
and its Supplemental Order on September 10. 1991. 
Maverik mailed its request that the Commission review its 
orders on October 30, 1992, and the document was date stamped at 
the Commission on the next business day. The Commission found this 
request to be late, and refused in its Order Denying 
Reconsideration (Appendix E) to grant an extension. 
5
 This document was timely appealed from in Docket # 
910413-CA, which appeal remains outstanding and was pending when 
each of the Commission's subsequent orders was purportedly 
entered. 
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Maverik had requested the one business day extension in its 
Request for Reconsideration. But its "good cause" for an extension 
was best set forth in its April 3, 1992 Limited Request for 
Reconsideration. Appendix F. The good cause includes: 
* the arbitrariness of the Commission's conduct, 
* shortness of the extension sought, 
* the fact the case was already on appeal, 
* the vague and undefined nature of the term "issuance"6, 
* the equally vague nature of the term "filing", 
* the fact the days of "lateness" included a Saturday, a 
Sunday and Columbus Day, October 14th, 
* The Supplemental Order was received by Maverik's counsel by 
mail, and the reconsideration request was actually received by the 
Commission about 28 days after its receipt by mail, 
* the fact that at the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental 
Order, Maverik's counsel were employed on an emergency basis to 
defendant a criminal defendant in a jury trial which began on 
September 16, 1992 and lasted for several days (ending in mistrial 
after six days). State of Utah v. Stephen Cartisano & Challenger 
Foundation II, 90-CR-47, Sixth Circ, Kane County. 
* Maverik's counsel had another trial on October 3, 1991 
before Judge Daniels of the Third District Court, along with 
several other court matters during the time period of September 18 
through October 10 (the due date for filing the reconsideration 
request). 
The Commission has never ruled on the Limited Request for 
Reconsideration. 
6
 However, an agency decision is considered "issued" for 
judicial review purposes on the date stamped on its face, here 
September 10th. Dusty's v. Utah State Tax Commission, 199 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah App. Oct. 30, 1992). This new ruling does 
not prevent the previous vagueness of the agency's handling of 
the question from being a reason for agency extension of its own 
internal review. 
9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission has entered various orders, all while their 
case was already on appeal. Its orders are void for lack of 
jurisdiction. In the alternative, the Request for Review was 
timely filed. Finally, Maverik showed "good cause" for its one day 
extension, and failure to extend the time constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
The ALJ has still never ruled on several issues, and to this 
day has still never specified the judgment amount. See argument in 
briefings ut voipan ion appPri1, Docket # 910413-CA. 
ARGUMENT 
l. Because the matter was on appeal the Commission 
lost jurisdiction to act. None of its orders or denials have 
any validity. After the Commission is reversed on the related 
appeal7, the matter can be remanded for appropriate action at that 
time. 
Although Maverik filed a Request for Review and two Requests 
for Reconsideration (see appendices) with the Commission, the 
agency's lack ol jurisdiction cannot be waived. Maverik filed 
those documents in an effort to protect itself from a "Catch-2211, 
Docket Number 910413-CA 
10 
following the* Commission's procedure of necessity to avoid losing 
its rights. 
In June, 1991 the Commission issued its ruling, purporting it 
to be final. When Maverik filed its timely appeal in July, the 
case was moved to this Court and remains here until remanded. See, 
Rules 3(g) and 14(a), Utah R. App. P., and compare with Rule 36, 
Utah R. App. P. (Issuance of Remittitur). An agency cannot exceed 
its jurisdiction.8 
While a judicial appeal of agency action is pending, there can 
be no review or further action on the original award. Farmer Motor 
Co. v. Smith, 249 Ky. 445, 60 SW2d 929 (Ky 1933); Feid v. 
Department of Labor & Industries, 1 Wash.2d 430, 96 P.2d 492 
(1939).9 
2. The time for reconsideration or appeal of the 
first order has passed. Maverik chose to appeal, and the 
Commission's power to enter to orders or reconsider terminated. 
See 2 AmJur2d Administrative Law Sec. 530, including notes 18 and 
19, and cases there cited. 
The non-agency corollary of this rule has been affirmed in 
Utah. When the issues in a main judgment are appealed, "the 
See, Bosquet v. Howe Scale Co., 120 A. 171, 172 (Vt. 
1923) . 
9
 See also, Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Durbin, 119 SW2d 595 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938) and other Texas and Florida cases cited at 
165 ALR 26 111(e). See also contra cases from Connecticut, 
Georgia, New Mexico and New Jersey at same location. 
11 
district court is indeed without jurisdiction as to them«" Peters 
v. Peters, 394 P. 2d 71, 73 (Utah 1964). "In this respect the 
divorce judgment is like other judgments." Id. 
Peters was a divorce case. While the decree was on appeal, 
the trial court adjusted the rights of the parties based on changed 
circumstances. The Supreme Court held that this was proper only 
because of the unique nature of family .1 aw, and because there had 
been a change of the family circumstances. A copy of Peters is 
attached as Appendix H. It clearly operates on the assumption that 
fi 1 ing an appea 1 robs the 11: i a 1 conrt of j urI sd Ic11 on unti 1 it i s 
remanded. 
Outside the divorce arena, once a case is appealed the trial 
court has :i 10 jurisdiction to modify the judgment, vacate i t or 
enter another. Davidson Chevrolet v. City and County of Denver, 
330 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Colo. 1958). The Davidson trial court was 
held to be i n er :i or for trying to reconsider its judgment after the 
appeal was already taken. In this matter, the Industrial 
Commission entered a supplemental judgment, denied review, denied 
reconsideration and changed its mind about the first judgment's 
finality, all after that judgment was taken up on appeal. 
3. The Commission has created a convoluted mess, it 
should have abstained from all action once the appeal was filed,, 
Having failed to abstain, the agency should have granted review, 
and later reconsideration. 
The agency has acted in a way t, hat: is inconsistent and 
12 
confusing at best, and an irrational pattern of conduct at worst. 
The Commission has: 
With regard to the first appeal, 
* found handicap discrimination without properly considering 
what a "handicap" is, 
* entered a "final" order that sets forth no damage amount 
(which it still has not calculated), and which reserves the 
attorney fee issue for further determination, 
* awarded an attorney fee amount that bears no relationship 
to any possible damage award (if one is ever set). 
With regard to this appeal, 
* first argued that no Request for Review by that agency was 
timely filed, refusing to consider that which was filed, even 
though the time limit for such a request is not jurisdictional, 
* argued that the initial order was final and unappealable, 
so this Court had no jurisdiction over the first appeal, 
* then entered a supplemental order awarding attorney fees 
(query: "supplemental" to a final order?), still stubbornly 
asserting that the original order was final, 
* then refused to review that order because Maverik's request 
was mailed on the due date rather than received, 
* implied that the reason it could not extend the time was 
because of Section 34-35-7.1( 11)(b) Utah Code does not permit it, 
Appendix C, page five. 
* later acknowledged that the above section only prohibits 
the agency from extending the time for judicial review, Appendix E, 
13 
page two, 
he one business day 
extension of time Maverik sought, Id., 
* at the same time (in its fourth formal and again "final" 
order) reversed itsei lolding, '" ,npon further review, we agree 
that the June 1991 order was not final because the issue of 
attorney fees > - • " <», 
emphasis added, 
* c. it- n Tit- samr- <-rue* ' , ; t.r. i* notwithstanding this 
"i/'oncess - • • 
without c remedy ; , ; alleged late :: , i*.. uf t request to reconsider 
that very order " supplemental" order, 
* r
 ( . • , J I n i w in t -, HI IfH • in«, 11 nil-, 
can be final ; valid without ever determining a damage amount, 
* never once distinguished or even dealt with the landmark 
c .ase on 1: lai idi c aj: cli sen i mi i la t::i on,10 nnn HVHII iineut loned 11 n 
10
 McCord also entirely ignores Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983). Confer (Appendix H) holds that 
handicap discrimination cannot exist unless the job is a "major 
life activity." The privilege of worker at a particular kind of 
job or for one employer is not a "major life activity." Id. at 
635. By requiring a "major 1ife activity" the legislature 
avoided making a discrimination lawsuit out of every termination 
based on a physical characteristic. Confer, 61A P.2d at 636. 
McCord denied that her goal or chosen occupation is convenience 
store clerking. Tr. 132. Without mentioning Confer, the ALJ 
ruled that working is a major life activity, so each job loss 
constitutes interference with a major life activity. This is 
directly against Confer1s holding. 
11
 Confer observes: 
Most or all persons have some physical or mental 
deviations from a norm or from personal or employer 
aspirations. Considerations of height, weight, sensory 
14 
The Commission has Maverik in a "catch 22". To issue an 
order, repeatedly say it is final, and then months later decide 
that it was not final after all, has created minor chaos in this 
case. Yet the agency and McCord would both have the Court dismiss 
both of these appeals. To allow such agency error to deny Maverik 
its well-asserted appeal rights would violate the open courts 
provision of Article I Sec. 11 of the Utah Constitution, as well as 
the due process clause of United States Constitution, Amendment 
XIV. 
Maverik has filed two appeals to this Court, both of which 
were timely. Maverik has moved to consolidate them, and the 
Commission has requested the same. How can either appeal be 
dismissed? 
4. The Request for Review was timely submitted. 
This issue is not determinative of the appeal, since the Commission 
had no jurisdiction to enter orders once the appeal was filed. See 
arguments one and two above. However, it is set forth in the event 
abilities, speech, pulse rate, blood pressure, and a 
whole variety of measures of mental ability are only a 
few characteristics whose variations can be deemed 
'impairments1 . . . . If the Legislature had intended 
that all employer decisions based on any such impair-
ments would be forbidden as discrimination against the 
handicapped . . . the statutory definition should have 
stopped with the word 'impairment1. Instead, the 
definition was limited to those impairments that 
'substantially' limit a 'major life activity'. 
Confer, supra, 674 P.2d at 636. 
15 
the Court finds to the contrary. 
necessary I, c dcja In not e 1.1M? s p e c i f i c e\ enl dates 
involved here. 
* June 28, 1991 - ALJ Findings, Conclusions and Order, calling 
itself "final" but asking for attorney fee evidence, Appendix A, 
• Maverik files f Lrst appeal (910413-CA) 
* September 10, 1991 - ALJ's Supplemental Order (adding 
attorney fees and costs) mailed to Maverik counsel. Appendix B. 
This order also calls itself "final". 
* October 10, 1991 - Maverik requests review, filed and served 
by mail, and was received by the Commission on October 11, 
* February 28, 1992 - commission's Order Denying Review, 
Appendix C, ruled Maverik tardy, and affirmed the initial July 26, 
1991 order and its September ]0, 199] supplemental order. 
* March 19, 199 Maverik fl les its Request for 
Reconsideration of the4" Appendix D 
* March 3 0, 199~ Commission's Order Denying Request lor 
Reconsideration Appendix E. (Appealed from here).12 
* April 3, 1992 Maverik files its Limited Request for 
Reconsideration explaining "good cause" for ai 1 extension,13 
* April 6 1 992 - Maverik files this Petition for Writ of 
Review. Appendix G 
Rule 6(e), URCP provides for ai 1 extra three days to respond 
a rn.-uied document, The Supplemental Order was mailed to Maverik 
counsel The Utah Rules of Ci vi ] Procedure apply \i I ] special 
2
 This is the order in which the Commission suddenly, 
after months of behaving and announcing to the contrary, reverses 
itself on final I ty: "Upon further review, we agree that the June 
26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attorney fees 
was reserved. . . . " Appendix E, Page 2. Despite this flip flop 
on finality (or, as the agency refers to it, this "concession"), 
the agency still denied reconsideration because of tardiness. 
13
 This request is still pending before the Commission, 
despite passage of eight months. 
16 
statutory proceedings" unless specifically excluded by the 
applicable statutory scheme. Rule 1(a), URCP.14 
"Filing" must occur before or within a "reasonable time" after 
service. Rule 5(d), URCP. This does not apply to jurisdictional 
acts, such as filing a complaint or notice of appeal. See, Rule 4 
and 5(a), URCP, and Rules 4 and 14, Utah R. App. P.; Isaacson v. 
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983); Silva v. Department of Emp. Sec, 
786 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1990). "Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing." Rule 5(b)(1), URCP.15 See general discussion in Fed. 
Proc. L. Ed. Section 65:138-139.16 
Since service is complete if made by mail, and filing must 
occur within a reasonable time thereafter, the request for 
reconsideration served on McCord's counsel by mail on the 30th day, 
and arrived at the Commission for filing on the very next business 
day. 
14
 But see Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1955), holding that the Rules do not apply to a 
proceeding before an administrative body seeking to regulate 
activities burdened with a public interest. Here the rights 
litigated were private. 
15
 The Commission's only argument for not applying the 
Rules of Civil Procedure to help define "filing" a request in an 
ongoing case, is that "Section 63-46b~12(1)(a), clearly 
establishes the timing standard for this administrative process." 
Appendix E, page 6. However, that statute merely states that an 
aggrieved party may "file" its "written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order . . . " It begs the 
question of what it means to "issue" an order or "file" a 
request. 
16
 "Appellants1 failure to file the motion within this 
period thus did not affect its timeliness" so long as it was 
filed within a reasonable time after service. Nichols v. 
Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension Plan, 835 F.2d 881, 887 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), notes 51 to 55. 
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Mailing of a request must be sufficien * 1 statute 
actually r equires that ;*• * ne pre*. _-...-, ofi.icer 
and to each party" Section «...*-4 6b- .; / ; " ii:- , -.
 ; , Utah Code There 
is no language evei - lowing L H H K J ±n person. If filing is 
expressly offered only by Maveri v' c ^p^vi ce and fi ] :ii i lg i s 
adequate. In a analogous situation, the Commission has ruled that 
*
j
»» ^  • i , i j in 11 in i f; j 11 II! I 111 i i i * i I w\ 11 ii i i ) i» 111 II in ( i n d l e a p ( I ' ,:i <" * '»" ' 11 * 11 in if in ii in 111 "'•' l » " i 
".led by regular mail, and "[t]he charge shall ieemed filed 
* the date of the postmark, n 1 filed regular mai 
i -11 - 2 i| I ) ainiil1 («c| Jin
 (, 111 .111 A d n i 1111 s t r < 1 1 r ' * • 
states that the opening request for agency action must be "filed" 
within 1-JVQ -T* the alleged discriminatory practice. Section 
3 
This Court has recently considered timeliness issue very 
similar tc • thi s one, and yet clifferer- • - r- - *' --.qnif-cant wav 
Dusty * s i U tail State Tax C o m m i s s i , . • - - ' • 
App. Oct 30, 11 992, In Dusty'-- • , , faced with -
Petition for Review by th i s Court uicti wdt> mdxi.ed un ciie jOth day 
after an agency rul :i ng, rather than a Request for Review by the 
agency itself, as we have here. 
IHi&t \ " "." 11 CHI iirii 1" i Ml n u l l I I in. in 1 I In ( J P ! i i [ o i i t ' i I d e l e r o t ) I rill i i n l ih»ivi? 
i t s t ime extended , because Sect ion 63 -45b-22, U ta h Code provides 
that the Commissioner may extend a l l time l i m i t s "except those time 
p « ' i r p < n f« vii, ll" y»", 
Rep. a t 8 9 Emphasis a l t ered from c i t a t i o n . Dusty's pointed out 
11
 I t was rece ived by t h e Court oi i the 3 3rd day. 
18 
that there may be a different standard in determining timeliness of 
a request for agency action, as opposed to judicial reviews. 199 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. 
6. The Commission abused its discretion in refusing 
to grant Maverikfs requested one day extension. Even if 
the statute and rules make the request a day late, clearly the 
agency abused its discretion by failure to grant Maverik1s request 
for a one day extension. The Commission has not adequately dealt 
with the series of reasons which Maverik believes constitute "good 
cause.I|18 
7. The judgment amount is still unknown. As stated 
in Maverik1s briefs, in the related appeal, no dollar amount has 
been set. How, can the Commission possibly be upheld? How can the 
Commission rule that Maverik has failed to take some post-order 
step in a timely manner? 
18
 See Appendix F. The good cause includes the 
arbitrariness of the Commission's conduct, shortness of the 
extension sought, the fact the case was already on appeal, the 
vague and undefined nature of the term "issuance", the equally 
vague nature of the term "filing", the fact the days of 
"lateness" included a Saturday, a Sunday and Columbus Day, 
October 14th, The Supplemental Order was received by Maverik's 
counsel by mail, and the reconsideration request was actually 
received by the Commission about 28 days after its receipt by 
mail, the fact that at the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental 
Order, Maverik's counsel's heavy workload, including emergency 
involvement in a high profile criminal defense in Kane County, 
19 
Further, s J nee the fl rst appeal was filed (and i in the midst 
I I l:»r i ef i ni]) th< Commission reversed itself , I ipon I u r t her r ev i ew, 
we agree that the June 26, 1 991 order was not final because the 
issue of attorney fees was reserved . . . M Order Denying Request 
for Reconsideration, March naap ^ppendi 
Under precisely the same rational, failure * calculate or 
otherwise establish a damage amount v~-- ndings which 
would permit an educated guess as to damages) prevents each of t he 
Commission's orders from being valid even ;- w, "If the findings 
• - • - ' may or cie:i : I 
cour r agenc\ > supplement, modify omplete the findings . 
m. • &><=•>:: ox~d^r * n e w t r i n further proceedings \ 
w. The Agency's errors are substantial and harmful. 
The Court has made clear what the standard of review is, as I s 
summarized in Section 63-46b- \J 6, Utah Code (Utah Administrative 
the case ; •>• looked Stewart n •: Review r "tii ^  
Rep, (April, 1992) requirement .-•:' showing that 
igency. Official Comments, Sec. 63-46b-
Indeed, the Court may decide the agency has erroneously 
interpreted the law i f the Court merely disagrees with the agency's 
interpretation , Id ci tied with approval, Morton International, 
±n<s. v - 5 i ( » , 8:1 4 I • 2d 
20 
basic issues of statutory interpretation like defining a 
"substantial" impairment of a "major life activity", no deference 
is given to the agency's legal conclusions. Savage Industries v. 
State Tax Com'n.i, 811 P.2d 664, 668, 670 (Utah 1991). An error is 
harmless only if it so inconsequential that there is "no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
Morton, supra, 814 P.2d at 584. 
9. McCord is entitled to a trial de novo. This used 
to be the procedure. Sec. 34-35-8, Utah Code (Repealed, 1990)2, 
construed in Univ. of Utah v. Industrial Com'n., 736 P.2d 630, 632 
(Utah 1987) . Since evidentiary rules are relaxed, discovery is 
limited, no jury right is afforded and procedure is very relaxed, 
due process requires a new trial before a real court. See, e.g. 
Art. I Sec. 11, Utah Constitution (open courts provision). 
Maverik is entitled to have its remedy "in due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial . . . and no person 
shall be barred from . . . defending before any tribunal in this 
State, . . . any civil cause to which he is a party." Id. See 
also, Art. I Sec. 10, Utah Constitution (trial by jury) . The 
appeal procedure used here, though arguably supported by statute, 
is unconstitutional. 
The process afforded to Maverik did not protect its due 
process rights. Questions regarding whether the Commission has 
2
 The termination claimed to be discriminatory occurred in 
October, 1988. 
21 
afforded c petitioner due process are questions of I dw. The 
determinet ions - » deterence. Lope?t ', < Vareer 
Service Review Board (Indus. Com'n.l, 188 Utah Adv. Hop. l'i :•(.) 
(Utah App. , May ?! / , 199 2) . 
CONCLUSION 
The law and facts require reversal * - Commission had 
jur :i sdi ei ion to do what if hhis done Whereff v - /erik requif 
that the award to McCord be vacated, and/or that the matter 
remanded for a i lew trial. Further, attorney fees and costs should 
Mavepri k, pi lr suai it to Se : 34- 3 5- 7 1 (9) 1 Jtal l Co die, 
2 
DATED the '. day of December, 1992. 
^u 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
David C. Cundick 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t • .ay oi uecembei ^ z , x 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing * nailed, 
postage prepaid, or hand del ivered, to: 
James W. Stewart, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Benjamin Sims, Esq. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
22 
I further certify that I lodged a prior draft of this brief 
with the Court of Appeals by postage prepaid mail on December 3, 
1992. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
23 
i TENDIX A 
Findings ot. Fact., Conclusions of Law and Order 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UADD Case No. 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES, 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on May 15, 
1991, at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The Charging Party was present and represented by 
James W. Stewart, Attorney at Law. 
The Respondent was present and represented by 
Mitchell Barker, Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim of discrimination based on handicapped status 
brought by Vicky McCord against Maverik Country Stores in 
connection with her termination of employment. The Charge was 
filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division on October 24, 
1988. The Division issued its Determination on January 24, 1991 
finding that Respondent had violated the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act of 1965, as amended, and issued an Order on the same date 
requiring Respondent to conciliate the issue. On February 15, 
1991, Respondent requested a formal hearing before the Commission 
on the Charge, and the request was granted. 
A de novo evidentiary hearing was held, during which sworn 
testimony and exhibits were presented. During the hearing, 
several rulings were Bade from the bench, including a denial of 
Respondent's oral Motion for Summary Judgment at the close of 
Charging Party's case. The Administrative Law Judge also found 
that Respondent's corporate officials received adequate notice of 
the Charge and subsequent investigation through copies to the 
TXHSFT f 
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corporate office. Respondent argued that a handwritten notation by 
an unidentified person of "no cause determination" on a letter 
dated February 6, 1991 constituted a finding of no cause by UADD 
(Exhibit A-16), but the Administrative Law Judge ruled that the 
UADD's actual Determination, dated January 24, 1991, was the only 
binding agency action on the merits. The parties expressly 
reserved the right to brief the question of attorney's fees 
following the issuance of an Order on the merits. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge and the 
parties were given time to submit simultaneous closing briefs. 
Having received said briefs, and having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Vicky Ann McCord (McCord) was hired as a clerk by Maverik 
Country Store on September 30, 1988. She was interviewed and hired 
by Maverik's Store Manager, Connie Jones (Jones.) Jones had the 
authority to hire and fire employees on behalf of Maverik, based on 
her testimony and that of her supervisors. McCord,s position was 
part-time, working six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.3 5 per 
hour. She worked eight shifts during her two weeks of employment, 
Exhibit A-17. She was trained by Jones and another employee, Suzie 
Jenkins (Jenkins.) Her duties including cashiering, stocking 
shelves, some bookkeeping and customer service. 
At the time of hiring, McCord filled out an employment 
application (Exhibit A-l), which included a question concerning 
physical abilities: "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory 
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap 
which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are 
applying?11 McCord checked the box marked "no." 
The evidence demonstrates that McCord had been diagnosed with 
a heart condition known as "mitral valve prolapse" during January, 
1988, while living in California. This diagnosis followed an 
episode of tightness in her chest and a racing heartbeat. She 
consulted a Dr. Watkins, whose opinion is not contained in the 
evidence. McCord's recollection of that consultation was that the 
condition did not present any restrictions on her lifestyle or 
employment. She was given a "beta blocker" medication and 
experienced no further problems. 
The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice of the 
generic information on mitral valve prolapse which was placed into 
the record by stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A-ll. Said 
information states, in part, that "mitral valve prolapse is a 
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common and usually benign heart condition... An estimated 4 percent 
to 7 percent of the population has MVP... Because MVP is so common, 
some authorities believe that the condition is simply a normal 
variant in heart structure, rather than a disease as such." 
Evidence was also submitted from Dr. Ace Madsen, who examined 
McCord after her termination, stating that McCord "is not at risk 
because of her heart problems in regard to her working at her job." 
(Exhibit A-7) Dr. Madsen further stated that the mitral valve 
prolapse problem, "should not interfere with any athletic or work 
related endeavors.•• 
On October 14, 1988, McCord reported for her shift at noon. 
Jones was working in the store office. McCord began working but 
felt some tightness in her chest and grew increasingly 
uncomfortable. She asked Jones if she could leave the store and go 
to the hospital to get her heart checked. In response to Jones' 
questions, she disclosed the mitral valve prolapse condition. 
Jones agreed to allow her time off to seek medical attention. 
At the hospital, McCord was examined and her heart was 
monitored (Exhibit A-18.) McCord testified that the emergency room 
doctor indicated her heart was fine, and suggested a change of her 
•'beta blockertf medication. After giving her a new prescription, he 
released her to return to work. 
While McCord was at the hospital, Jones referred to McCord's 
application and noted that no heart condition had been disclosed. 
Jones later called the hospital to check on McCord, and could not 
obtain any information. McCord called Jones approximately two 
hours later and offered to resume her shift. Jones told her to 
stay home and rest. Jones then called McCord back and told her she 
needed to come in to the store and discuss the situation with 
Jones. McCord grew apprehensive and asked why. Jones stated that 
she would prefer not to discuss the matter on the telephone, but 
she went on to say that Jones' mother had died from heart problems, 
and her son had recently had heart surgery. Jones commented that 
she was concerned about the seriousness of McCord's heart problem. 
The parties dispute whether or not McCord then came into the 
store for a subsequent discussion with Jones, or whether the 
termination of employment took place by telephone. In either 
event, a discussion was had between Jones and McCord later that day 
concerning McCord's heart condition. Jones asked McCord why she 
did not disclose the heart condition on her application. McCord 
responded that she did not believe it presented any restrictions on 
her performance of the job, and she did not consider it life-
threatening. Jones then reiterated her statements about Jones' 
mother and son having heart problems, and stated she would be 
afraid to leave McCord in the store alone. McCord stated that she 
VICKY MC CORD 
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did not perceive her condition to be as serious as that of Jones' 
mother or son. Jones then terminated McCord's employment with 
Maverik, stating that she would "do better somewhere else.11 
On the same day, Jones prepared a Record of Employee 
Counseling form as required by Maverik policy (Exhibit A-4) which 
states that McCord was terminated, and described the circumstances 
in an attached handwritten letter. That letter states in part: 
I told her I would worry about her being on the job 
alone. She said it would not happen again and I then 
told her how could she make that guarantee when she had 
to leaver earlier and said she would not remain on the 
job. 
I also told her my sympathies were with her as my son had 
had open heart surgury (sic) July 1st and my mom had died 
of heart problems and complications following surgery. 
At this time I told her she had not mentioned this at the 
interview when asked if she had medical problems that 
would interfere with her doing her job. 
I then told her it would be best if she looked for other 
less stressful employment. 
Jones testified in the hearing that the reasons she stated in 
Exhibits A-4 and A-5 were the actual reasons she made the decision 
to terminate McCord. Exhibit A-5 is Jones' response to the Anti-
Discrimination Division investigation. It states in pertinent 
part: 
The day I terminated Vicki it was due to many things, all 
relating to her inability to handle stress on the job and 
do her job accurately... 
According to Vicki she told me in the office that her 
heart problem was sometimes brought on by stress. A 
convenience store clerk is under nothing but stress. Not 
only is the pace fast, but you are responsible for 
stocking, cleaning during your shift, dealing with 
customers and running the cash register... 
My opinion at the time I terminated Vicki was that both 
physically and mentally she would be more comfortable in 
a job that had a slower pace. 
There was some testimony at the hearing concerning McCord's 
job performance. Both Jones and Jeinkins testified that McCord had 
difficulty reading the gasoline pump meters correctly. McCord 
admitted this problem but added that Jones and Jenkins reassured 
her that other employees had the same problem during the first few 
weeks. Jenkins and Jones testified that each had customers 
complain about the smell of liquor on McCord's breath during work, 
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and they smelled it also. Jones stated that she asked McCord on 
one occasion if she had been drinking and she denied it. McCord 
denied under oath the use of alcohol before working. Jones and 
Jenkins testified that McCord was accurate in her cash register 
till, and McCord recalled having been complimented on her accuracy. 
Despite the above comments, Jones did not mention any claimed 
job performance problems with McCord during the termination 
discussion. That discussion centered around Jones' perception of 
a heart problem. The Record of Employee Counseling which 
documented the termination did not state any other reason for 
counseling, although it contained blanks for such reasons as 
"intoxication,,f "personal conduct," "unsatisfactory work 
performance," and "violation of company rules." (Exhibit A-4) It 
also contains a statement that McCord's performance was "average." 
There is no documentation that Jones ever counseled or disciplined 
McCord concerning the performance issues described above. 
Substantial testimony was taken on such issues as the other 
handicapped employees working for Maverik, and the employment 
history of McCord prior to this job, but such matters are deemed 
not relevant to the claim of handicapped discrimination. 
Respondent's witnesses Robert Child and Dana Dean, both senior 
Maverik employees to Jones, testified that Jones did have authority 
to hire and fire employees, and that she acted within the scope of 
her authority with regard to McCord. 
After being terminated by Maverik, McCord pursued other 
employment. She testified and introduced evidence showing that she 
made application at twenty-six places of employment during 1989-
1991 (Exhibit A-8). She did briefly work at Ashley Elementary 
School as a janitor from November, 1988 through January, 1989. She 
anticipates working for the Forest Service this year. There was 
also some attenuated testimony at the hearing concerning the 
allegation that Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements 
of a personal nature about McCord to third persons in the Vernal, 
Utah area. There is, however, no direct evidence that Maverik or 
its employees ever interfered in McCord's ability to seek other 
employment. 
Based on the testimony of Jones, it is apparent that Jones 
retains some hostile feelings toward McCord. She testified to 
making a derogatory personal comment about McCord while waiting to 
testify in the hearing. She also admitted during testimony that 
she did not consider McCord to be honest nor "a good person." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Utah law provides that it is a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice for an employer to terminate any person, 
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otherwise qualified, because of handicap, U.C.A. 34-35-6. 
"Handicap" is defined in the rules promulgated thereunder as "a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one of 
more of an individual's major life activities. Being regarded as 
having a handicap is equivalent to being handicapped or having a 
handicap," R486-1-2(F)(1). 
"Major life activity" is defined to include experiencing 
difficulty in "securing, retainingv or advancing in employment 
because of a handicap," R486-1-2(F)(3). "'Is regarded as having an 
impairment' means (a) has a physical or mental impairment that does 
not substantially limit major life activities but is treated as 
constituting such a limitation; (b) has a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as 
a result of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or 
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the definition of 
physical or mental impairment above but is treated as having such 
an impairment," R486-1-2(F)(6). 
The statute and regulations further provide that "An employer 
shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or 
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program," 
R486-1-2(J)(1)• 
Applying the above law to the facts, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that Maverik Country Stores engaged in a prohibited 
employment practice under Utah law when it terminated Vicky McCord. 
Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of McCord 
as handicapped. There was no evidence that McCord's actual 
physical condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a physical 
or mental impairment, but it was "treated as constituting such a 
limitation," R486-1-2(F)(6)(a) and further, did "substantially 
limit major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of 
others toward such an impairment," R486-1-2(F)f6)(c). 
Specifically, Jones' attitude toward persons with heart 
conditions was shown to be discrixninatory. McCord has met her 
burden of proof by showing that she was terminated from employment, 
the termination was due to her employer'6 perception of her as 
handicapped, she was otherwise qualified to perform the work (since 
no other reason was given for termination at the time it became 
effective), and her employer made no attempt or inquiry regarding 
possible accommodations. Her employer did not even seek to obtain 
medical advice about the perceived handicap — its symptoms, 
treatment or how it would affect McCord's job performance — before 
making the immediate decision to terminate. 
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Maverik asserts that McCord failed to meet her burden because 
she is not handicapped, and argues the very limited medical 
evidence in support of this position. The Administrative Law Judge 
concedes that McCord's condition of mitral valve prolapse in this 
instance does not appear to present any impairment to McCord's 
ability to perform her job. Nevertheless, the law is clearly aimed 
at both actual and perceived handicaps. This is a case where 
Manager Jones' perception of handicap (based on Jones' emotional 
and unsubstantiated analogy to her own family situation — not on 
any medical evidence) was discriminatory in itself. 
Maverik also urges the Commission to find that "convenience 
store clerking is not a substantial life activity," Respondent's 
Closing Brief, p. 6, and therefore, discrimination cannot be found. 
Maverik's counsel misses the point of the anti-discrimination laws 
and regulations. Mc Cord testified that she pursued permanent 
employment with Maverik as a means of supporting herself and her 
son. It would be absurd for the Commission to cmgage in an 
analysis of which types of employment are "career" or "non-career," 
as Respondent argues. "Employment" is clearly listed as a category 
in the litany of "major life activities" set forth by Rule, and 
McCord's employment was terminated. 
Maverik asserts that McCord's performance problems were the 
actual reason for termination. This is not supported by the 
evidence. Manager Jones alone made the decision to terminate 
McCord's employment. The best evidence of her basis for this 
decision is the contemporaneous document she prepared at the time, 
Exhibit A-4, Record of Employee Counseling, and the reasons she 
gave McCord in the termination discussion. Both state the reason 
as McCord's heart problem, and Jones' non-medical perception that 
it was related to job stress. Subsequently, Jones has stated that 
factors such as pump reading problems, general nervousness, and 
possible drinking contributed to the decision to terminate. Since 
none of these was discussed with McCord or documented by Jones 
prior to termination and this claim being filed, such suggestions 
lack credibility. Further, McCord had only worked at Maverik for 
two weeks prior to termination, and there is no indication that 
these factors had led Jones to consider termination or even 
discipline, until the heart condition became known. 
Finally, Maverik claims that McCord is not otherwise qualified 
to perform the job. McCord was presumably performing the job up 
until the moment she asked for the time to go to the hospital, and 
her qualifications had not been questioned at that point. At 
termination her performance was rated by Jones as "average.11 For 
Maverik to suggest in hindsight that McCord's qualifications were 
lacking begs the question. 
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McCord has suffered damages as a result of Maverik's 
prohibited employment practice, in that she has been deprived of 
wages and benefits of employment. Utah law states that if an 
employer is found to have engaged in a prohibited discriminatory 
practice, the Commission shall "issue an order requiring the 
respondent to cease any discrimination or prohibited employment 
p>ractice and to provide relief to the complaining party, including 
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorney's fees,11 U.C.A. 
34-35-7.1(9). 
Awards of back pay are governed by federal law, 42 U.S.C. 
2 000e-5, and the purpose thereof is to make the party whole for 
injuries suffered through discrimination. In this case, back pay 
is calculated at a rate of $3.3 5 per hour for 24 hours per week, or 
$8 0.4 0 per week. The period of back pay runs from the date of 
termination through the date of this Order. While McCord argues 
for the use of incremental raises, based on those received by 
another employee, the Administrative Law Judge does not find that 
probative in McCord's case. The evidence is too speculative to 
establish that McCord would have, in fact, qualified for these 
incremental raises by passing the tests required. The 
Administrative Law Judge does incorporate by reference the 
increases in federal minimum wage, effective April 1, 1990 to $3.80 
per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to $4.25 per hour, for 
purposes of calculating the back pay award (Exhibit A-12.) 
Respondent asks the Commission to terminate McCord's back pay 
award as of the date she secured employment as a janitor for Ashley 
Elementary School in November, 1988. This employment lasted only 
two months. A review of pertinent case law demonstrates that 
victims of discrimination do have a duty to mitigate their back pay 
damages by actively seeking other suitable employment, and "Interim 
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the 
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the 
back pay otherwise allowable," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). Therefore, 
McCord's back pay award must be reduced by all earnings from 
interim employment, including Ashley Elementary School. 
However, the Ashley Elementary employment does not toll the 
period of back pay since McCord#s employment there was not 
terminated voluntarily. Consistent with case law enunciated in 
Bradv v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (1985), "the 
[back pay] period is tolled when the quit is motivated by personal 
reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal 
convenience," Id. at 1278. Since McCord was required to quit 
Ashley Elementary due to illness beyond her control, that period of 
employment should operate as an offset only against the back pay 
award. 
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McCord argues that front pay ought to be awarded in lieu of 
reinstatement with Maverik Country Stores, due to the hostility 
shown McCord by Jones and other employees during the pendency of 
these proceedings. The Administrative Law Judge finds that 
reinstatement is still an appropriate remedy, given the fact that 
Jones no longer works for Maverik, substantial time has passed 
since these incidents and presumably, reinstatement could be 
arranged in another Maverik location or capacity. 
McCord is entitled to the value of employment benefits she has 
lost as a result of the discriminatory termination. No proof was 
introduced of the specific Maverik benefit programs to which McCord 
could have been entitled, and therefore, none can be awarded based 
on the evidence in the record. 
The parties reserved the question of an appropriate attorney's 
fees award, pending this Order, and shall address that in 
supplemental briefs to the Commission. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores is found 
liable of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice in the 
nature of handicap discrimination against Vicky Ann McCord, and 
that Maverik Country Stores cease any discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practices immediately; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores provide full 
relief to Vicky Ann McCord, including reinstatement to employment 
in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with full 
rights, privileges and protections of employment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay to Vicky 
Ann McCord back pay, at the rates specified above, from the date of 
unlawful termination until the date of this Order, subject to all 
lawful offsets due to interim employment; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take 6uch 
affirmative action as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from 
its environment any employment discrimination prohibited by law; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores not 
retaliate against Vicky Ann McCord for having exercised her right 
to file this action; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee to counsel for Vicky Ann McCord, subject 
to both parties submitting vrritten legal briefs on this question to 
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the Commission; McCord's counsel shall submit his brief on 
attorney's fees on or before twenty days from the date of this 
Order; Maverik's counsel shall submit a response briei, if any, on 
attorney's fees on or before twenty days thereafter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Maverik Country Stores take any 
other applicable and reasonable relief as may be necessary to 
restore Vicky Ann McCord to her rightful position. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake, City, Utah, this 
•^/rtl- day of 'Jwo-.f , 1991, 
ATTEST: 
OL ir.r-7?* f M ,JL 
Patricia O. Ashby_ 
Commission Secretary 
APPENDIX B 
Supplemental Order 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. UADD 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On June 26, 1991, an Order was issued in the above case, 
finding that Maverik Country Store illegally discriminated against 
Vicky Ann McCord on the basis of a perceived handicap. The parties 
were granted additional time to submit legal briefs on the amount 
of legal fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, pursuant to 
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9). Said briefs and supporting affidavits have 
been received and reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge, who now 
enters the following Supplemental Order on the sole issue of 
attorney's fees. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Charging Party's counsel has made application for $25,400.50 
in attorney's fees and $1,536.26 in costs in connection with the 
prosecution of this claim. The attorney's fees represent the work 
of three attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec and Diane Abbeglen, 
at the hourly rates of $125, $80 and $80, respectively. The costs 
involve mailing, transcribing, witness costs, phone calls, computer 
time and copying. 
Respondent opposes the award of the attorney's fees as 
claimed, and alleges that the fees are overstated and 
unconscionable. They note that the entire damage award to Ms. 
McCord was only in the range of $8,000, and the fee claimed far 
exceeds that amount. 
The Administrative Law Judge has carefully reviewed the 
pleadings on this issue, and has considered the circumstances of 
the case itself, which she heard on behalf of the Commission. She 
has also reviewed Utah cases which provide guidance on the award of 
attorney's fees, including Travner v. Cushincr. 688 P. 2d 856 (Utah 
1984); Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and fiixi* 
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The attorney's 
fees in this case are awarded on the basis of U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(9). 
Case law identifies the following key factors to consider in 
awarding attorney's fees: relationship of the fee to the amount 
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recovered, novelty and difficulty of the issues, overall result 
achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights, 
Travner, supra, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, customary 
fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved, Cabrera, supra. f,The total amount of attorneys 
fees awarded in [a] case cannot be said to be unreasonable just 
because it is greater than the amount recovered on the contract," 
Cabrera at 625. 
This was a relatively straightforward claim of handicap 
discrimination, which required a one-day administrative hearing. 
No pre-trial proceedings or pleadings were required. Very limited 
discovery was conducted, and the majority of the work for the 
attorneys on both sides consisted of preparation for, and 
attendance at, the actual hearing. It was necessary for Charging 
Party to initiate a formal proceeding to vindicate her rights, 
since the Respondent had not acknowledged its liability under the 
"cause" finding of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division. The 
overall result obtained by Charging Party's counsel was successful, 
and the hourly rate billed by counsel was within the customary 
range for the Salt Lake City legal community. Charging Party's 
counsel was knowledgeable and competent in the area of employment 
discrimination law. 
However, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was a lack 
of efficiency in presenting the case, and the number of hours spent 
on particular pleadings was excessive. A disproportionately large 
block of Charging Party's attorneys' time was spent preparing 
written closing arguments, and later, preparing the brief on 
attorney's fees. 
This is regrettable, due to the fact that the Administrative 
Law Judge customarily hears only oral closing arguments, but herein 
made an accommodation to the parties' request and allowed vritten 
closing arguments. Parties in an administrative hearing are 
expected to come to the hearing prepared to make both opening and 
closing statements orally at the hearing. Certainly it was not 
envisioned that allowing a written, instead of oral, presentation 
would increase the Charging Party's total legal costs by a factor 
of nearly one-third. Moreover, such charges defeat the purpose of 
handling discrimination claims in an administrative forum, where 
judicial economy is a priority. 
The Administrative Law Judge suspects that both parties could 
not resist the urge to r«litigate the hearing itself by submitting 
extensive written closing arguments. This is very understandable 
in light of both attorneys' conduct during the eight-hour hearing, 
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in which objections and arguments continually interrupted the flow 
of testimony, and there was a notable lack of cooperation between 
counsel on even the smallest evidentiary matters. The 
Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that those circumstances left 
the impression that perhaps the hearing testimony needed to be re-
presented in written, summary form, and then re-argued as part of 
closing arguments. Unfortunately, this process required 34.10 
hours of Mr. Stewart's time, and 36.75 hours of Ms. Krivanec's 
time, according to the fee affidavits submitted. That expenditure 
of time approaches the amount of hours spent in hearing preparation 
itself, and is found to be excessive. 
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's 
counsel in connection with the written closing arguments are 
partially disallowed as follows: of the 34.10 hours spent by Mr. 
Stewart on closing arguments, two-thirds (23 hours) are disallowed; 
of the 36.75 hours spent by Ms. Krivanec on closing arguments, two-
thirds (24 hours) are disallowed. This leaves Mr. Stewart with 
106.10 total compensable hours and Ms. Krivanec with 64.40 total 
compensable hours. 
The balance of the attorney's fees claimed include substantial 
time for preparation of the pleadings on the attorney's fee issue 
itself: 37.05 hours of Ms. Abbeglen's time at $80.00/hour •* 
$2,960.00. As can be seen from the hearing transcript, the 
Administrative Law Judge was very interested in handling the 
attorney's fees issue in the simplest and least costly manner. She 
asked the parties if they could stipulate to merely submitting 
attorney's fees affidavits following her ruling, and not requiring 
a further hearing on that single issue. The parties so agreed, and 
again, it was not envisioned that by doing so, nearly $3,000 would 
be spent on the preparation of those affidavits. (Respondent's 
counsel matched this lack of restraint by filing two separate legal 
briefs contesting the award.) Claims of attorney's fees are 
routine and commonly done by large firms such as Charging Party's 
counsel. It should not require more than a few hours of organizing 
and tabulating bills. The affidavits from other attorneys in 
similar practices are superfluous in an administrative forum, and 
are not necessary unless specifically requested by the ALJ. 
Therefore, the attorney's fees claimed by Charging Party's 
counsel in connection with the legal fees claim are partially 
disallowed as follows: of the 37.05 hours spent by Ms. Abbeglen on 
the legal fees claim, two-thirds (25 hours) are disallowed, leaving 
16.45 total compensable hours. 
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The remainder of Charging Party's legal fees are specifically 
found to be reasonable and supported by the evidence, and are 
awarded to Charging Party as a matter of statutory legal right. 
The costs have been examined closely and all appear to be related 
to the prosecution of this claim. They are not excessive and were 
reasonably necessary for case preparation; therefore, they will be 
awarded as claimed. 
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge rejects the argument 
that Charging Party's fee is unreasonable because it far exceeds 
the damage award. Damage awards in employment cases are strictly 
limited to lost wages/benefits, and it is not reasonable to expect 
that Charging Party's counsel could have prepared and litigated 
this case for some fraction of a few thousand dollars. This is 
especially true in this case, where Respondent's counsel asserted 
many frivolous arguments unsupported by tenets of discrimination 
law. The principles at stake in a discrimination case render it 
more valuable to a Charging Party than a mere dollar figure, and 
attorneys' fees may exceed the actual damages in many employment 
cases. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The attorney's fees claim submitted by Charging Party's 
counsel is reasonable and supported by the evidence, with the 
exception of two-thirds of the hours spent on written closing 
arguments and two-thirds of the hours spent on legal fees 
affidavits and briefs. Following such deductions, Respondent shall 
be liable for Charging Party's attorney's fees and costs, pursuant 
to U.C.A. 35-34-7.1(9). 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent, Maverik Country Store, 
pay the legal fees of Charging Party, Vicky Ann KcCord, in 
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this 
Commission, in the amount of $19,731.00. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent, Maverik Country Store, 
pay the legal costs of Charging Party, Vicky Ann McCord, in 
connection with the handicap discrimination claim before this 
Commission, in the amount of $1,536.26. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Revisw of the 
foregoing shall be filsd in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
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date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified on this /ff-Q day of C% + -Zt^/> ^) , 1991. 
ATTEST: 
P a t r i c i a O. Ashfcy ( f~ 
Cor l i s s ion Secretary-
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Order Denying Review 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UADD CASE NO- 89-0031 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for 
Review of the administrative law judge's Order dated June 26, 1991 
which was submitted by respondents. The authority for review is 
conferred by U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11), and Section 63-46b-12. 
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on 
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the 
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24, 
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed 
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24, 
1991. Respondent requested a formal hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ), and the request was granted. As a 
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10, 
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney 
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the 
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and 
September 10, 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991 
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion 
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order, 
and could not therefore contest its provisions. 
The relevant facts are as follows. Ms. McCord was hired as a 
clerk by the Maverik Country Stores on September 30, 1988. She was 
interviewed and hired by Ms. Connie Jones, the store manager. Ms. 
McCord worked eight six hour shifts, four days per week at $3.35 
per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. (Exhibit A-
17). She performed cashiering, bookkeeping, customer service, and 
stocking shelves. 
She had answered MnoM to respondent's employment application 
question which asked her "Do you have any respiratory, circulatory 
ailments or heart trouble or other physical condition or handicap 
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which may limit your ability to perform the job for which you are 
applying?" However, Ms. McCord had been diagnosed with a heart 
condition called "mitral valve prolapse" while living in California 
in January 1988 after she had tightness in her chest and a racing 
heartbeat. Ms. McCord related that her doctor had informed her 
that the condition required no changes in lifestyle or employment. 
She was prescribed a "beta blocker," and she had no further 
difficulties. 
Both parties stipulated that, among others, "mitral valve 
prolapse is a common and usually benign heart condition...." Dr. 
Ace Madsen examined Ms. McCord after her termination, and 
determined that she was "not at risk because of her heart problems 
in regard to her working at her job." Exhibits A-ll, A-7. 
While working on October 14, 1988, Ms. McCord experienced some 
tightness in her chest and grew increasingly uncomfortable. She 
asked her supervisor, Ms. Jones, if she could go to the hospital to 
get her heart checked. Ms. McCord disclosed her mitral valve 
prolapse condition to Ms. Jones in response to questions. 
While Ms. McCord was at the hospital, Ms. Jones checked Ms. 
McCord's application for employment. No heart condition had been 
noted by Ms. McCord. The doctor at the hospital indicated that Ms. 
McCord's heart was fine, but gave her a prescription for a change 
of beta blocker. Although Ms. McCord called about two hours later, 
and offered to complete the shift, Ms. McCord was told to stay home 
and rest. 
It is not clear where the termination of employment took 
place. There is some dispute about whether the termination took 
place over the telephone or at the store, but Ms. McCord was 
apparently called or summoned to the store by Ms. Jones on the same 
day as the hospital episode. During several of the discussions 
between Ms. Jones and Ms. McCord which took place on that day, Ms. 
Jones stated that her mother had died from heart problems, and her 
son had recently had open heart surgery. During the termination 
discussion, Ms. Jones expressed concern about the seriousness of 
Ms. McCord's heart problems. Ms. Jones then asked Ms. McCord why 
she did not disclose the heart condition on her application. Ms. 
McCord replied that she believed that it presented no restrictions 
on her, and that she did not consider it to be life threatening. 
Ms. Jones responded that she (Ms. Jones) would be afraid to leave 
Ms. McCord in the store alone. She then terminated Ms. McCord'& 
employment. 
A Record of Employee Counseling form was completed by Ms. 
Jones which describes the circumstances of Ms. McCord's termination 
in a typewritten attachment. Exhibit A-4. This form and 
attachment show that Ms. Jones was greatly concerned about Ms. 
VICKY MCCORD 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
McCord's heart problem, and the potential that Ms- McCord would 
have another medical episode under the stress created if she 
continued employment at Maverik. Ms. Jones wrote that "I then told 
her it would be best if she looked for other less stressful 
employment.•• Id. 
Ms. Jones stated in response to an inquiry from the UADD 
during its investigation that "The day I terminated Vicki it was 
due to many things, all relating to her inability to handle stress 
on the job and do her job accurately.... •' Exhibit A-5. Again, it 
appears that Ms. Jones was focusing in on the stress factor. 
At the hearing, some additional factors for termination were 
discussed: 1) Ms. McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump 
meters; and, 2) allegations that customers and employees had 
complained about smelling alcohol on Ms. McCord's breath during 
work. Ms. McCord denied using alcohol before working, and Ms. 
Jones and another employee testified that Ms. McCord's cash 
register till was accurate. Significantly, none of these 
allegations were discussed during the termination interview, or 
were written on the termination form or attachment. 
There is no question that Ms. Jones had the authority from 
Maverik to hire and fire Ms. McCord. 
Ms. McCord testified and introduced evidence that after her 
termination she attempted to find employment at 26 employment 
locations during 1989-1991. Exhibit A-8. She worked for a short 
time as a janitor at an elementary school from November 1988 
through January 1989. Although there was some testimony that 
Maverik employees had made unfavorable statements about Ms. McCord 
to other persons in the Vernal area, the ALJ found no direct 
evidence that Maverik or its employees had ever interfered with Ms. 
McCord's ability to seek other employment. 
The ALJ then concluded as a matter of law that f,Maverik 
Country Stores engaged in a prohibited employment practice under 
Utah lav when it terminated Vicky McCord." The ALJ based this 
conclusion on Maverik's perception of Ms. McCord as handicapped. 
There was no evidence that McCord's actual physical 
condition of mitral valve prolapse constituted a phy-
sical or mental impairment, but it was 'treated as 
constituting such a limitation,' ... and further, did 
'substantially limit major life activities only as a 
result of the attitudes of others toward such an im-
pairment. . . . ' 
Order, ALJ at 6 (June 26, 1991), citations omitted. 
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The ALJ further stated in her application of facts to her 
conclusions of law that Ms, McCord was otherwise qualified to 
perform the work. 
The ALJ then ordered the following in favor of Vicky Ann 
McCord and against Maverik Country Stores: 
1. Liability for a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice in the nature of handicap discrimination. 
2. An order to Maverik to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practices. 
3. Full relief to Ms. McCord including reinstatement to 
employment in a position commensurate with her qualifications, with 
full rights, privileges and protections of employment. 
4. Payment of back pay calculated at $80.40 per week for 
2 4 hours per week with the period of back pay running from the date 
of termination through June 26, 1991 with increases in pay 
commensurate with increases in the federal minimum wage effective 
April 1, 1990 to $3.80 per hour, and effective April 1, 1991 to 
$4.25 per hour, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim 
employment. 
5. An order to Maverik to take such affirmative action 
as may be necessary to eliminate and keep from its environment any 
employment discrimination prohibited by law. 
6. No retaliation by Maverik against Ms. McCord for 
having exercised her right to file this action. 
7. Payment of a reasonable attorney's fee by Maverik to 
counsel for Ms. McCord. 
8. Maverik was to take any other applicable and 
reasonable relief as may be necessary to restore Ms. McCord to her 
rightful position. 
9. And, finally, a notice that any Motion for Review of 
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 30 days of June 26, 
1991, specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, 
and that the order would be final and not subject to review or 
appeal unless such a filing were made. 
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ISSUE ONE 
WHETHER MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES 
TIMELY FILED ITS MOTIONS FOR REVIEW? 
The ALJ issued her initial Order on June 26, 1991. She then 
issued a supplemental order dealing only with attorney's fees on 
September 10, 1991. The Request for Review by Maverik was received 
by the IC on October 11, 1991. This request was not received 
within the 30 days after issuance of the initial order on June 26, 
1991, as required by U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(l)(a), and good cause 
for the delay has not been shown by Maverik under U.C.A. Section 
63-46b-l(9). The latter statute states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
Thus, the order of June 26, 19 91 cannot be reviewed by the IC, and 
therefore becomes the final order of the IC with regard to the 
issues addressed within it. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(11)(b). 
With regard to the order of September 10, 1991 which related 
to attorney's fees, the filing by Maverik of its Request for Review 
was mailed by it on October 10, 1991, and was received by the IC on 
October 11, 1991. R486-1-4-5 (Utah Admin. Code) requires that a 
request for review be submitted in accordance with U.C.A. Section 
63-46b-12. 
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) requires an aggrieved party to: 
File a written request for review within 30 days 
after the issuance of the order with the person 
or entity designated for that purpose by the sta-
tute or rule. 
The operative portions of the statute above are "file a 
written request for review within 30 days...with the person...11 and 
"after issuance of the order...." Since issuance of the order is 
the first in the sequence of events which triggers the 30 day 
period, the nature of issuance roust be determined. 
There is little case law construing the meaning of issuance, 
but what little there is indicates that issuance of an order is 
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synonymous with delivery or mailing. Sunnyside Nurseries, Inc. v. 
Agri. Labor Relations Bd.. 156 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155, 93 CA.3d 922. 
The Order of the ALJ shows that it was mailed on September 10, 
1991. Therefore, the issuance took place on that date. 
It has been suggested that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(URCP), Rule 6(e) gives the aggrieved party an extra three days to 
file. This reliance is misplaced since Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) 
clearly establishes the timing standard for this administrative 
process. 
Since Maverik's Request for Review was received on October 11, 
1991, that is the date of filing. That date was on the 31st day 
after issuance, and was not timely. However, the IC will discuss 
the remaining issues as raised by Maverik for the benefit of the 
parties. 
ISSUE TWO 
WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS "ERRONEOUSLY 
HIGH, AND SHOULD BEAR SOME RELATION 
TO THE DAMAGES SOUGHT?" 
U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) allows the ALJ to, among other 
actions, award attorneys' fees and costs. The ALJ awarded Ms. 
McCord's counsel legal fees of $19,731, and awarded Ms. McCord 
$1,536.26 for costs in connection with her claim before the IC 
Maverik asserted the issue of whether the fees were 
"erroneously high, and should bear some relation to the damages 
sought" in its Revised Memorandum Opposing Attorney Fee Award which 
was received by the ALJ on August 13, 1991. Ms. McCord's legal 
counsel had sought $25,400.50 which was claimed to represent the 
work of thr€>e attorneys, James Stewart, Kay Krivanec, and Diane 
Abbeglen, at the hourly rates of $125, $80, and $80, respectively. 
The ALJ reduced the fees to the amount noted in the immediately 
preceding paragraph. 
The ALJ correctly used the factors to both award and to reduce 
the award based on case law which identified the following key 
factors to consider in awarding attorney's fees: relationship of 
the fee to the amount recovered, novelty and difficulty of the 
issues, overall result achieved, necessity of initiating a lawsuit 
to vindicate rights, efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 
customary fee in the locality, and the expertise and experience of 
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the attorneys involved. Supplemental Order of the ALJ, at 2 (Sep. 
10, 1991). 
Maverik asserts that Ms. McCord will recover approximately 
$8,000, and that the attorney's fees are excessive when that 
recovery is considered. The amount in controversy is a factor 
only, and it generally takes as much time to try a discrimination 
case for an employee making a minimum wage as it does to try one 
for a supervisor receiving much more compensation. £f. Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985). 
Considering all relevant factors, we cannot say that the 
amount awarded was excessive based on the ALJ's reasoning to the 
effect that this hearing required one full day; that the attorneys 
for Ms. McCord carefully documented their hourly charges; that Ms. 
McCord had to initiate the hearing to vindicate her rights since 
Maverik did not acknowledge its liability notwithstanding the cause 
finding issued by the UADD; that the result obtained by Ms. 
McCord's counsel who were knowledgeable and competent in employment 
discrimination law was successful, and that the fees charged were 
within the customary range for the Salt Lake City legal community. 
Since Ms. McCord's counsel have not challenged the reduction 
of their fees, we will not discuss the reduction except to note 
that we find the reduction to be reasonable and appropriate. 
For the above reasons, we find the attorney's fees awarded to 
Ms. McCord's attorneys to be appropriate in light of the 
documentation, expertise and work required in her case. 
ISSUE THREE 
WHETHER THE ALJ ERRED IN 
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT 
OF DAMAGES? 
Maverik styled its issue as stated in the heading above, but 
more specifically at page 2 of its request asked whether the ALJ 
abused her discretion in awarding Ms. McCord lost wages for time 
periods "after she acquired a better paying job, which she later 
quit?" 
It is appropriate to award back pay from the date of the 
discrimination until the date of judgement or the date of trial. 
Gathercole v. Global Associates, 560 F.Supp. 642, 647 (1983), rev'd 
on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1984); Wells v. North 
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Carolina Bd of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983) 
cert, den. 464 U.S. 1044, 79 L.ed 2d 176, 14 S.Ct. 712. The ALJ 
awarded back pay in this instance from the date of termination 
until the date of her order. 
Federal law governs the award of back pay in other types of 
discrimination cases, but is instructive in this case. 42 U.S.C. 
Section 2000e-5. The purpose of an award of back pay is to make 
the party whole for injuries suffered through discrimination. The 
employer is not responsible for losses willingly incurred by Ms. 
McCord. Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.. 753 F.2d 1269, 1278 
(4th Cir. 1985). We can find nothing in the file which shows that 
Ms. McCord willingly incurred any loss. When she left her 
employment at the elementary school, she did so due to illness 
beyond her control. The ALJ correctly required only an offset by 
reducing Ms. McCord's award by all earnings from interim 
employment, including her elementary school job. 
We therefore find that the ALJ was correct in law and fact in 
light of the entire record. 
ISSUE FOUR 
DID THE ALJ ERR WHEN SHE 
FOUND THAT MAVERIK HAD TREATED 
MS. MCCORD AS IF SHE WERE HANDICAPPED? 
Maverik asserts that the ALJ erred when she found that Maverik 
had treated Ms. McCord as if she were handicapped. The ALJ found 
that "Maverik's termination of McCord rested on its perception of 
McCord as handicapped." Order of the ALJ, at 6 (June 26, 1991). 
Maverik now claims that Ms. McCord is not handicapped since mitral 
valve prolapse is a common condition usually accompanied by no 
symptoms at all. Trial Brief as incorporated into the Request for 
Review, Maverik Country Stores, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1991). 
This issue is relevant as it relates to U.C.A. Section 34-35-
6(1) (a) (i) which states in pertinent part: 
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or 
to discharge, demote, terminate any person, ... 
because of ... handicap .... 
The Utah statutes do not discuss the concept of perceived 
handicap. However, R486-1-2 (Utah Admin. Code) was promulgated by 
the UADD under the authority of U.C.A. 34-35-5(b), and provides 
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that the subject individual will be treated as if he or she has a 
handicap where the individual: 
Has a record of such an impairment ... or has 
been regarded as having, a mental or physical 
impairment .... 
R486-1-2F5 (Utah Admin. Code). 
The Utah Administrative Code further provides that the 
individual may be regarded as having a handicap if others think 
that he or she has such a disability, or is considered by others to 
have a limitation on a major life activity. R486-l-2F6a,b,c (Utah 
Admin. Code). A person who has no disability or handicap, but who 
is treated by others as if he or she is impaired (perception of 
impairment) , may be just as impaired by virture of treatment by 
others as one who is actually impaired. 
The ALJ correctly found that the termination was due to Ms. 
McCord's employer's perception of her as handicapped, and that she 
was otherwise qualified to perform the work. Finally, her employer 
made no attempt to obtain medical advice as to the perceived 
handicap, or whether she could reasonably accommodate Ms. McCord's 
perceived medical condition. 
We therefore conclude that this asserted issue by Maverik is 
without merit, and that the ALJ was correct. 
ISSUE FIVE 
WHETHER THE ALJ INCORRECTLY 
FOUND THAT ANY PERCEIVED 
ABNORMALITY CONSTITUTES 
A PERCEIVED HANDICAP? 
It is clear to us that the ALJ did not find that any perceived 
abnormality constitutes a perceived handicap. Maverik misstates 
the findings of the ALJ. A finding of abnormality is not required. 
Whatever impairment exists must be either a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's 
major life activities, U.C.A. Section 34-35-3(9), and where the 
impairment does not actually exist either in part or in whole, the 
perception must also rise to the level of substantially limiting 
one or more of a person's major life activities. 
Major life activity is defined as including experiencing 
difficulty in "securing, retaining, or advancing in employment 
because of a handicap.... •• R486-1-2F3 (Utah Admin. Code). 
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A person is regarded as having an impairment when he or she 
(a) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities, but is treated as constituting such a 
limitation; (b) has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the 
attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (c) has none of 
the impairments listed in the definition of physical or mental 
impairment above, but is treated as having such an impairment. 
R486-1-2F6 (Utah Admin. Code). 
Here, Maverik terminated Ms. McCord based on its perception of 
the severity of Ms. McCord's medical condition. Ms. McCord's 
condition was probably not an impairment, but her condition was 
treated as a serious one by Maverik. A job is a major life 
activity, including clerking at a convenience store, and there is 
a legal requirement to reasonably accommodate such employees unless 
undue hardship can be shown. 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the ALJ met the 
requirements of law in light of the whole record. 
ISSUE SIX 
WHETHER A MEDICAL EXPERT IS 
REQUIRED TO TESTIFY BEFORE 
A FINDING OF HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION 
CAN BE MADE? 
Both parties stipulated before the hearing that mitral valve 
prolapse is usually a benign condition, and that Exhibit A-ll would 
be "authoritative on the condition of Mitral Valve Prolapse...." 
Exhibit A-ll. Having stipulated that this exhibit would be 
authoritative as to Ms. McCord's condition, there appears to be no 
good reason why a medical expert is required. The question before 
the ALJ was not whether Ms. McCord was actually handicapped, but 
whether Maverik treated her as if she was disabled. The evidence 
is clear that even though Ms. McCord was capable of performing her 
job, Maverik's manager perceived her to have a serious heart 
problem, and as a result fired her. 
No medical expert was required. 
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ISSUE SEVEN 
WHETHER MS. MCCORD SHOWED THAT 
SHE WAS QUALIFIED TO ACT IN THE 
JOB? 
Maverik contends that Ms. McCord never showed that she was 
qualified for the job from which she was terminated. At the time 
of Ms. McCord's termination she was told that she was terminated 
because of her heart condition. It was only after the termination, 
and after an investigation was requested by the UADD, that Maverik 
gave any other reasons for Ms. McCord's termination. 
While working at Maverik, Ms. McCord's supervisor was 
confident enough in her abilities to leave her alone to perform her 
duties in the store after only three days of training. Ms. Jones, 
her supervisor, had never confronted Ms. McCord with any of the 
allegations which were subsequently lodged against her after the 
termination. In fact, Ms. McCord was scheduled to work on the day 
of her termination alone for most of her shift. 
At the hearing, Maverik alleged that Ms. McCord was not 
otherwise qualified because of problems she had reading the gas 
pumps. However, a witness who worked for Maverik testified that 
everyone had problems reading the pump meters. Ms. McCord 
testified that prior to her termination she had learned to read the 
meters, and that she had been complimented on her accuracy on the 
till. 
It is significant that Ms. McCord was apparently performing 
her job duties properly until the time that she asked to go to the 
hospital, and that her qualifications had not been questioned up to 
that point. 
This alleged error is therefore without merit, and we find 
that the ALJ determinations and conclusions were correct. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the previous reasons, we find that the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Administrative Law Judge 
were correct in law and fact in view of substantial evidence in the 
whole record. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the orders of the administrative law judge 
dated June 26, 1991, and September 10, 1991 are affirmed. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
auM^ 
ephen M. Hadle 
Chairman 
tyVAs/t 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this ^£77^ day 
of >rr,Ln„^.. . , 1992 
E S T - - y / ^ 7 i / 
Commission Secretary 
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Request for Reconsideration 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, 
Applicant, 
vs . 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORE (sic), 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
UADD Case No. 89-0031 
TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH: 
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through 
counsel, coiries nov; and respectfully requests that the Commission 
reconsider its "Order Denying Review", issued on February 28, 1992 • 
This Request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code. 
The grounds for relief from the order are as follows: 
1. Tne Commission has erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-
1(9) to make the filing of Maverik's Petition for Review untimely, 
and to avoid exercise of the Commission's discretion in extending 
any such deadline. The statute expressly applies only to time 
EXHIBIT 
periods "established for judicial review." It does not apply to 
agency review. 
2. To the extent necessary, Maverik hereby moves for a one 
day extension to petition for review by the Commission. 
3. The Commission has misperceived the law, in holding that 
the June 26, 1991 order of the ALJ was final. Issues were 
specifically and expressly reserved in that order (including 
attorney fees), and damages were not even calculated. The order 
was comparable to a partial summary judgment, which cannot be 
appealed to the next judicial level so long as issues remain 
undetermined. So long as the agency's order reserves anything to 
the agency for further decision, it is not a final order. Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
4. Not being a final order, the petition for the Commission 
to review it could not have been tardy. 
5. While the commission acknowledges that the amount of 
recovery is a factor in determining attorney fee reasonableness, 
its Order Denying Review fails to expressly consider what effect 
the amount of recovery had in this case. See Order Denying Review, 
page seven. 
6. Attorney fees could not have been awarded and cannot be 
evaluated for reasonableness with the case in its current posture, 
since the amount of principal recovery has not been calculated, nor 
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can it be calculated based on the any order the Commission has 
entered to date. 
7. The Commission erred (Order Denying Review, page eight) in 
announcing how the damages could be calculated. It did so based on 
assumptions about voluntariness of McCord's losses, without basing 
the observation on any finding by the ALJ to that effect. Damages 
simply cannot be calculated without further hearing and 
supplemental findings. 
5. The Commission failed to consider the leading cases on the 
issues involved, particularly whether McCord can be said to have 
been treated "as if11 she were "handicapped." See, e..g. Salt Lake 
City v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, lie P. 2d 63 (Utah App. 1989) and Hurley v. Board 
of Review, 167 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988). 
For all of the above reasons, Maverik requests that the 
Commission reconsider in full its Order Denying Review. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 1992. 
Ronald C. Backer,Mitchell R. 
Barker and David C. Cundick 
Attorneys for Defendant Maverik 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 1992, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 44580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Benjamin A. Sims 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
X / A 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX E 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, * 
* 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING 
vs. * REQUEST FOR RE-
* CONSIDERATION 
* 
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES, * 
* UADD No. 89-0031 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for reconsideration by the respondent in the 
above entitled matter to review its Order Denying Review, issued on 
February 28, 1992, having been duly considered under the authority 
of U.C.A. Section 63-46b-13 (1953 as amended), the request for 
reconsideration is denied for the following reasons: 
This case involves a claim of discrimination based on 
handicapped status brought by Vicki Ann McCord against the 
respondent Maverik Country Stores (Maverik). The charge was filed 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) on October 24, 
1988, and claimed a violation of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
of 1965 by illegal termination of employment. The UADD confirmed 
the discrimination against Ms. McCord by its Order on January 24, 
1991. Respondent requested a formal hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALT), and the request was granted. As a 
result of the hearing, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order were issued by the ALJ on June 26, 1991. On September 10, 
1991 the ALJ issued a supplemental order dealing with attorney 
fees. On October 15, 1991, the respondent requested review by the 
Industrial Commission of the ALJ's orders of June 26, 1991, and 
September 10, 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Ms. McCord filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Request for Review of the June 26, 1991 
Order stating that the respondent had not timely filed his Motion 
for Review with the IC in connection with the June 26, 1991 Order, 
and could not therefore contest its provisions. 
Maverik Country Stores first contends that the Commission has 
erroneously interpreted section 63-46b-l(9) to make the filing of 
Maverik's Petition for Review untimely, and to avoid exercise of 
the Commission's discretion in extending any such deadline. This 
section states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
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shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
(Emphasis added). 
This statute allows a presiding officer to lengthen or shorten 
a time period based upon good cause shown. Maverik did not ask the 
Commission to lengthen its time period based on good cause shown, 
nor did it show any good cause for doing so. As can be seen by its 
clear strictures, it applies only to agency review, and not to 
judicial review as asserted by Maverik. We therefore reject 
Maverik's first issue. 
Next, Maverik asks for a one day extension to petition for 
review by the Commission. Again, this request must be rejected 
hashed on failure of Maverik to show good cause. 
Third, Maverik states that the ALJ order of June 26, 1991 was 
not final since issues were specifically reserved in the order and 
damages were not calculated. Upon further review, we agree that 
the June 26, 1991 order was not final because the issue of attor-
ney fees was reserved by the following language: 
The parties reserved the question of an ap-
propriate attorney's fees award, pending 
this Order, and shall address that in sup-
plemental briefs to the Commission. 
Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). 
Notwithstanding this concession, Maverik did not meet the 
statutory deadline for filing a request for review of the final 
order which addressed attorney fees issued on September 10, 1991 by 
the ALJ. Again, Maverik has shown no good cause as to why the 
Commission should extend the filing time. 
Maverik also contends that the order could not have been final 
because damages were not calculated. It cites Sloan v. Board of 
Review, 781 P. 2d 463 (Ct. App. 1989) for this proposition. We find 
that the order of the ALJ was explicit enough to calculate damages 
since Ms. McCord was awarded, among other provisions, reinstatement 
to employment, and back pay, at the rates specified on page eight 
of the ALJ order, from the date of unlawful termination until the 
date of the ALJ order, subject to all lawful offsets due to interim 
employment. Order, ALJ at 9 (June 26, 1991). The offsets are 
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listed on page eight of the order, and the date of termination, 
among other findings of fact, are shown on pages two through five. 
The monetary damages can thus be reasonably calculated. 
The remaining allegations of error were addressed in the 
Motion of Review of defendant dated October 15, 1991, and the 
Commission again finds them nonmeritorius. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Request for Reconsideration of 
defendant is dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this o3£^day of 
' )7?u« l^ 1992. 
ATTEST: — ^ , 
Patricia O. Ashby; 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage the 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on Vicky Ann McCord, Case 
No. 89-0031 on 30 March 1992 to the following: 
Mitchell R. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
James E. Stewart 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 910413-CA 
IN A. SIMS 
APPENDIX F 
Limited Request for Reconsideration 
Ronald C. Barker, #0208 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-9638 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 
VICKY ANN MCCORD, ! 
Applicant, 
LIMITED REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
VS . ; 
| Case Number: UADD 89-0031 
i 
MAVERIK COUNTY STORES, j 
Respondent, 
Responding defendant Maverik Country Stores, Inc., through 
counsel, comes now and respectfully requests that the Commission 
reconsider its denial of Maverik1s request that the Commission 
lengthen its time within which to file any motion for review by the 
Commission of the Supplemental Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge, which was issued on or about September 10, 1991. This 
request is made pursuant to Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code, and is 
limited to a request for review of the denial of an extension of 
time. 
The grounds for relief from the Order are: 
1. The procedural events in this matter to date are as 
follows: 
a. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lav and Order was issued, 
reserving attorney fee issue for later determination, June 26, 
1991. 
b. Supplemental Order awarding approximately $20,000 in 
attorney fees and costs issued by the Adrinistrative Lav Judge, 
September 10, 1991. 
c. Request for Review prepared and mailed October 10, 1991 
but not received by the Commission until October 15, 1991 (the day 
after Columbus Day). 
d. Industrial Commission issues Order Denying Review, finding 
in part that Maverik's Motion for Review was untimely, February 28, 
1992 . 
e. Maverik files Request for Reconsideration, March 19, 1992, 
including therein a Motion for an Extension of Time through August 
15, 1992 for filing a Petition for Review. 
f. Commission issues Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration, including denial of Maverik's request that the 
time period with in which to Request Review be extended, March 30, 
1992. 
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2. Good cause has been shown and is further shown herein (see 
below) . The good cause previously shown was the fact that the 
document was prepared, executed and mailed on October 10, 1991, 
which is the due date by statute. 
3. Section 63-46b-l(9), Utah Code, permits lengthening of any 
time period for action by the Commission ,ffor good cause shown". 
4. The Commission has, for the first time in its Order 
Denying Reconsideration, properly found that the original Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge Church was not a final order. See, 
Order Denying Reconsideration, March 30, 1992, page 2. This 
changes the entire face of this case and justifies appropriate 
review of all the matters at issue. The Commission having 
determined the initial order to be non-final, procedural matters 
should be set aside for an initial determination on the merits of 
the ALJ's original order. 
5. Further good cause for the extremely short extension 
request that is shown as follows: 
a. Most of the "tardy" days are not chargeable to Maverik 
under lav. They include October 12 and 13, weekends, as well as 
October 14, Columbus Day. 
b. As pointed out in the Commission's Order Denying Review, 
page 5 and 6, there is little case authority construing what 
constitutes "issuance" by the Commission. It is also far from 
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clear what constitutes "filing" with the Commission. Because of 
these ambiguities and because of the policy of the Commission of 
avoiding hyper-formality, extensions should be freely granted when 
requested in good faith. 
c. The Supplemental Order for which review was sought by 
Maverik was received by counsel for Maverik on September 11 or 12, 
1991, 28 or 29 days prior to the preparation and mailing of the 
Petition for Review. 
d. At about the time the ALJ issued her Supplemental Order, 
and just prior to Kaverikfs counsel receiving the same, the 
undersigned, Mitchell R. Barker, was employed on an emergency basis 
to defend a criminal defendant in a jury trial set to start (and 
which did start) on September 16, 1991. The case was State of Utah 
vs. Stephen Cartisano and Challenger Foundation II, 90-CR-47, Sixth 
Circuit Court, Kane County. 
e. From prior to receipt of the Supplemental Order until 
September 17, 1991, Mitchell R. Barker and David C. Cundick, who is 
the other attorney who is handling this case and who appeared at 
the formal hearing in this matter with Mr. Barker, were both 
involved day and night in defense of Stephen Cartisano in that well 
publicized trial which was held in Kanab, Utah. Little time was 
taken to eat or sleep, and there was no time to consider items 
received in the mail. 
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f. September 18, 1991, was the first day that Maverik's 
counsel were back in the office, after the Cartisano trial ended in 
a mistrial. The Cartisano matter is scheduled to be heard again in 
May 1992 after a change of venue to West Valley City. 
g. The undersigned had another trial on October 3, 1991 
before Judge Daniels in Third District Court, along with several 
other in Court and out of Court matters during the period from 
September 17, 1991 through October 10, 1991, the date Maverik's 
Petition was due and the date it was prepared and mailed. Those 
included several days trying to catch up on office work after the 
Cartisano. 
h. On the due date for the Petition, it was not ready and 
hand delivered to the Industrial Commission before 5:00 because 
virtually the entire day was spent researching and arcjuing before 
Judge Mower of the Sixth Circuit Court in Kane County, on the issue 
of Cartisanofs successful Motion to Change Venue from Kane County 
to Salt Lake County. 
6. Under Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code, it appears that on the 
due date for intra-agency review a request may be mailed rather 
than hand filed. That section states that the request shall "state 
the date upon which it was mailed" and "be sent by ©ail to the 
presiding officer and to each party11. See also Section 63-46b-
1(9), Utah Code. 
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7. This is not a repeat of the prior motion to reconsider, or 
a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to reconsider. An 
enlargement of time was first requested on March 19 of this year, 
and was denied for the only time on March 30, 1992. 
Wherefore, good cause has previously been shown and is here 
further shown for the very short extension sought be Kaverik to 
make its Petition for Review of the Supplemental Order timely, 
despite the fact that it was mailed on the due date and received 
shortly thereafter by the Commission. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 1992. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Ronald C. Barker 
David C. Cundick 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of April, 1992, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage 
prepaid to: 
James W. Stewart 
Kay C. Krivanec 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Benjamin Sims 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX G 
Peters v. Peters 
PETERS v. PETERS Utah p / l 
Cite as 304 r .2d 71 
15 Utah 2d 413 
Morris L. P E T E R S , Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Virginia S. P E T E R S , Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 10059. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 20, 1904. 
Divorce action. The Second District 
Court, Weber County, Parley E. Norseth, 
J., granted divorce to wife, and husband 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, T., 
held that divorce court, which had granted 
divorce to wite with lump sum award in 
lieu of alimony, had jurisdiction, notwith-
standing husband's appeal, to grant tem-
porary alimony and counsel fees to defend 
appeal, provided that alimony payments 
were credited upon lump sum award 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <S=>I30 
Evidence in divorce action, including 
evidence of husband's conduct tending to 
cause wife great mental anguish and dis-
tress, justified award of divorce to wife 
rather than to husband. 
2. Divorce C=24l 
Award to divorced wife of $2,500 in 
lieu of alimony was not excessive, where 
husband was permitted to retain home and 
securities and wife had worked and con-
tributed toward maintenance of home and 
paid her own medical and dental bills. 
3. Divorce C=^I82 
District court is without further juris-
diction as to questions of divorce, child 
custody, support money, alimony or prop-
erty rights when they are once adjudi-
cated and appeal is taken, but has continu-
ing jurisdiction to enforce rights of parties 
to meet needs of spouses and children. 
4. Divorce O 3 0 9 
Subsequent changes or new orders in 
support money order must be based on 
changed circumstances. 
5. Divorce <§^I82 
Divorce court, which had granted di-
vorce to wife with lump sum award in lieu 
of alimony, had jurisdiction, notwithstand-
ing husband's appeal, to grant temporary 
alimony and counsel fees to defend appeal, 
provided that alimony payments were cred-
ited upon lump sum award. U.C.A.1953, 
30-3-5. 
Ronald N. Boyce, Salt Lake City, Clay-
ton & Gould, Ogden, for appellant. 
La Mar Duncan, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
After a trial, the lower court dismissed 
the complaint of plaintiff Morris L. Peters 
and granted a divorce to defendant Virginia 
5. Peters on her counterclaim; gave her a 
lump sum award of $2,500 in lieu of alimony 
and $350 counsel fees. After plaintiff filed 
notice of appeal, upon supplemental pro-
ceeding, the court awarded defendant $50 
per month temporary alimony and $300 
counsel fees to defend the appeal. Plain-
tiff appeals from both the judgment and the 
supplemental order. 
The parties were married on November 
6, 1961, in Preston, Idaho, and have since 
lived in Ogden, Utah. It was a second mar-
riage for both. Plaintiff Morris was 54 and 
defendant Virginia 40 years old. Virginia 
had a teenage son, Eddie, by her prior mar-
riage, and Morris had custody of a teen-
age girl, Jacklyn Peters, whom he and his 
former wife had reared. At first both chil-
dren lived with these parties, but soon 
thereafter it proved that Eddie was not wel-
come in the plaintiff's home, and he went to 
live with his own father. 
Both plaintiff and defendant were em-
ployed. Morris worked for the Ogden 
Railroad Company and received about $10,-
000 per year gross, $6,000 net. Virginia 
had worked most of the time during the 
marriage and was earning $325 per month 
at the time of the divorce. 
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Supreme Court has, under special circum-
stances, awaided counsel fees because that 
is a matler peculiarly within the knowledge 
of the court.3 But it has neither said, nor 
intended to imply, that the trial court could 
not make such an award. It is to be noted 
that the situation with respect to alimony 
or support money is different. The com-
plexities, actual and potential, upon which 
such awards must necessarily be based re-
quire the taking and consideration of evi-
dence, which this court is neither equipped 
nor disposed to do. 
[3] Plaintiff's contention that the trial 
court was without jurisdiction to make the 
order complained of rests upon a miscon-
ception as to the judgments appealed from. 
It fails to distinguish between the main 
judgment in the divorce action and the sub-
sequent order made in the supplemental pro-
ceedings. It is true that the main judgment 
is a final and appealable judgment as to the 
issues therein dealt with. When those ques-
tions as to divorce, custody of children, sup-
port money, alimony and/or property rights 
are therein adjudicated and an appeal is 
taken, the district court is indeed without 
further jurisdiction as to them. In this 
respect the divorce judgment is like other 
judgments. But there is another aspect of 
a divorce proceeding which is entirely dif-
ferent. After the main judgment is entered 
life goes on, and the needs of the spouses 
and the children and the duties to fulfill 
them continue day after day. In order to 
take care of these needs, it is essential that 
the trial court have continuing jurisdiction 
to enforce the rights of the parties. 
It requires but a moment's reflection to 
see what a mischievous situation would 
exist if. for example, a husband misbehav-
ing in failing to provide, and perhaps in 
abusing his wife and/or children, could ap-
peal a judgment and continue the neglect 
and abuse during the appeal. The difficulty 
could be magnified in various ways de-
pending upon circumstances, including such 
facts as that a destitute family, living a 
long distance from the state capitol, may 
be required to suffer undue delay and hard-
ship, or even left entirely without remedy, 
unless the district court could act. 
There is no good reason why not, and 
every reason why, that court should and 
does have continuing jurisdiction in the ac-
tion over the family's continuing problems 
to protect the rights and interests of the 
parties. That this is true and was so rec-
ognized by the legislature is indicated in 
Section 30-3-5, U.C.A1953: 
"When a decree of divorce is made the 
court may make such orders in relation 
to the children, property and parties, 
and the maintenance of the parties and 
children, as may be equitable; * * *. 
Such subsequent changes or new orders 
may be made by the court w ith respect 
to the disposal of the children or the 
distribution of property as shall be 
reasonable and proper." (Emphasis 
added.) 
[4,5] Subsequent changes or new or-
ders, which must be based on changed cir-
cumstances,4 obviously could only be made 
by the court in supplemental proceedings 
as was done here. Until the plaintiff re-
fused to pay the $2,500 and took the appeal, 
the defendant could not have petitioned for 
the allowances of which the plaintiff com-
plains upon the basis set forth because the 
circumstances giving rise to the need did 
not exist until then. Her petition stating 
those facts invoked the jurisdiction of thr 
court in a new and supplemental proceed-
ing in which it was authorized to make 
such further orders as it deemed reason-
able, equitable and ju»t under ihc circum-
stances.5 
5. Sco Cody *. Cody, 47 Vtnli -r>0. ir>4 P. 
052, and Oldham v. Oldham. 2S N.M. 1G3, 
20s P. 8SG. and aU'o 19 A.L.R.2d 703. 
3. See Ca^t v. Cast. 1 Utah 12s: lliwlriik* 
v. Hendricks 01 Utah .">(*.». GT» I\2d f>12; 
Prtorson v. Pctorson, 112 Utah 542, 1M) 
P.2d 001. 
4. Sro Chaffer
 v. Chaffee, G.°, Utah 2f>1, 225 
P. 76. 
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The main judgment and the order in sup-
plemental proceedings are both affirmed, 
provided that the alimony payments of $50 
per month are credited upon the $2,500 
lump sum alimony award. Costs to defend-
ant (respondent). 
HENRIOD, C. J., and McDONOUGH, 
CALLISTER and WADE, JJ., concur. 
15 Utah 2d 418 
Vickie J. PIERCE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
George ANAGNOSTAKIS d/b/a The Shah, 
and Shah, Inc., Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 10081. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 14, 1904. 
Waitress* action against restaurant 
owner to recover minimum wages and value 
of meals not furnished to her. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph 
G. Jeppson, J., entered a judgment for 
waitress, and the restaurant owner ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J., held 
that claim that waitress agreed to be com-
pensated by tips only to conceal her income 
from Bureau of Internal Revenue and that 
restaurant owner did not know of minimum 
wrage or her intention to conceal her income 
would not defeat waitress' right to collect 
minimum wage for women as provided by 
schedule promulgated pursuant to statute. 
Affirmed. 
I. Labor Relations C=>I278 
Statute providing for payment of 
minimum wages and schedule promulgated 
thereunder by Industrial Commission relat-
ing to minimum wage for women and chil-
dren shows intention to allow collection of 
minimum wage even in face of express 
agreement to work for less money. U.C.A 
1953, 34-4-9, 34-4-17. 
2. Labor Relations <S=H262, 1293 
Minimum wage provision for womer 
cannot be satisfied either by tips or by ex-
press agreement to effect that employee wil" 
accept tips or other gratuities in full satis-
faction of wages. U.CA.1953, 34-4-9, 34-
4-17. 
3. Labor Relations <§=>I262, 1475 
Claim that waitress agreed to be com-
pensated by tips only to conceal her inconv 
from Bureau of Internal Revenue and tha* 
restaurant owner did not know of minimum 
wage or her intention to conceal her income 
would not defeat waitress' right to collect 
minimum wage for women as provided by 
schedule promulgated pursuant to statute. 
U.CA.1953, 34-4-9, 34-4-17. 
4. Labor Relations C=>I535 
Evidence supported allowance of $82 50 
against restaurant owner for meals not 
furnished to waitress suing to collect mini-
mum wage due her under regulation re-
quiring that in restaurant occupations one 
substantial meal per shift must be furnished 
by employer at no cost to employee. U.C.A. 
1953, 34-4-9, 34-4-17. 
5. Labor Relations €=>I570 
Where waitress bringing suit against 
employer for minimum wages did not com-
ply with statute providing that person must 
have made a demand in writing for sum 
not to exceed money found due before court 
may award attorneys' fees, the court prop-
erly refused to award attorneys' fees to 
waitress whose demand substantially ex-
ceeded amount awarded by court. U.C.A. 
1953, 34-4-1 et seq., 34-9-1. 
Richards, Bird & Hart, Salt Lake City, 
for appellant. 
James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
WADE, Justice: 
Plaintiff, respondent here, Mrs. Vickie J. 
Pierce, brought this action to recover from 
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plaintiff was not working at the time of the 
accident Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
plaintiff had a reasonably certam prospect of 
employment that she would have accepted had 
the accident not occurred. 
When construing a statute, we must give effect 
to legislative intent, West Jordan v. Morrison, 
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). To that end, we 
presume that the Legislature used each term 
advisedly, and we give effect to each term 
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. 
Id For assistance in ascertaining the meaning of 
statutory language, we look to the background 
and general purpose of the statute. Jamison v. 
Utah Home Fire Ins, Co., 559 P.2d 958, 959 
(Utah 1977). 
The No-fault Automobile Insurance Act was 
enacted M|t|o effectuate a more efficient, 
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of 
the personal injury claims that arise out of 
automobile accidents." Utah Code Ann. 
§31-41-2 (1974). PIP benefits are intended to 
provide immediate compensation for 
out-of-pocket expenses and actual loss of 
earnings incurred as a result of an accident 
without having to bring a lawsuit. See Jamison, 
559 P 2d at 959. Unlike an award of damages 
based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are 
paid monthly so that claimants can continue to 
meet basic living expenses Utah Code Ann 
§11 A-22-109(5) PIP benefits were not intended 
"to provide an automatic reward or a 'windfall/ 
for being involved in an accident by requiring 
payment when there was no loss actually 
suffered . . . ." Jamison, 559 P.2d at 960. 
Although Jamison dealt with PIP benefits for 
loss of household services, the basic policy 
referred to there applies equally to disability 
benefits. 
In providing limited compensation for "any 
loss of gross income and the loss of earning 
capacity per person from inability to work 
. . . ," we conclude that the Legislature did not 
intend to provide compensation for "loss of 
earning capacity" unless a claimant has suffered 
a direct and specific monetary loss Although the 
term "loss of earning capacity" may well have a 
broader meaning than "loss of gross income" 
with respect to damages recoverable in a tort 
action for personal injuries, we believe that in 
the context of PIP benefits, the Legislature 
mtended that "earning capacity," insofar as it 
means something more than loss of "gross 
income," means income that a claimant, if 
unemployed, was reasonably certam to receive. 
Thus, if a claimant is unemployed at the time of 
the accident, that claimant may have a right to 
disability benefits for a job that he or she would 
have commenced after the accident, had the 
accident not occurred. But to qualify for such 
benefits, a claimant would have to show that a 
job was available for which the claimant was 
qualified and that the claimant would have taken 
that job. 
In the instant case, plaintiff was not working 
at the time of the accident, nor did the evidence 
UTAH ADVAf 
indicate a reasonable probability that she would 
have commenced working after the accident. 
In short, plaintiff's contention that section 
31 A-22-307(l)(b)(i) permits a claimant to collect 
benefits merely by showing loss of earning 
capacity and nothmg more is not consistent with 
either the statutory language or the policy of the 
Act. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
CltCM 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUSTY'S, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Auditing Division of the UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
No. 920215 
FILED: October 30, 1992 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS-
Mark K. Buchi, R Bruce Johnson, William 
Kelly Nash, Salt Lake City, for Dusty's 
R. Paul Van Dam, Susan L. Bamum, Salt Lake 
City, for Tax Commission 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reportei . 
PER CURIAM: 
Dusty's, Inc., brought an original proceeding 
in this court seeking judicial review from a final 
Tax Commission order that imposed a sales tax 
on Duty ' s sale of warranties The Commission 
moved for summary disposition on the ground 
that Dusty's petition was untimely. This court 
granted the Commission's motion by minute 
entry. Before us now is Dusty's motion to 
reinstate the petition for judicial review. We 
deny that motion. 
A brief sketch of the procedural facts is in 
order. On March 25, 1992, the chairman and 
three commissioners of the Commission signed 
a document entitled "Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision." 
Below the signatures appeared the Commission's 
seal and the following paragraph: 
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NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after 
the date of this order to file in Supreme 
Court a petition for judicial review. Utah 
C o d e A n n . § § 6 3 - 4 6 b -1 3 (1 ) , 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
On Monday, April 27, thirty-three days after 
the date of the order, Dusty's filed in this court 
its "Petition for Review of Final Decision of 
State Tax Commission." In invoking this court's 
jurisdiction, Dusty's stated, "This Petition is 
timely made as it is filed withm thirty (30) days 
of the final decision of the Commission." 
Review by this court was granted, and Dusty's 
filed its docketing statement. This time, the 
jurisdictional invocation claimed that the petition 
"was timely filed within thirty days after receipt 
of notice of the Final Decision of the 
Commission pursuant to Utah Ad nun. R. 
R861-l-8a[sicl (1992)." 
The Commission moved for summary 
disposition on the ground that the petition had 
been filed three days late. Dusty's opposed the 
motion. This court granted the motion to 
dismiss. 
Dusty's motion to reinstate the appeal is 
grounded in the same arguments as was its 
opposition to summary dismissal, and the 
Commission's opposition to reinstatement 
repeats what it argued in the memorandum 
supporting its motion to dismiss. We first state 
the position each side has taken on this 
junsdictional issue and then proceed to address 
the merit or lack of merit of each. 
Dusty's concedes that this court has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency actions 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA), Utah Code Ann §§63-46b-l to -22 
(1989 & Supp. 1992). Dusty's believes, 
however, that its petition was nonetheless timely 
under section 59-1-504 of the Code. Under that 
section, says Dusty's, Commission actions 
become final thirty days after the date of mailing 
of the Commission's notice of agency action. 
Dusty's goes on to say that the Commission 
has interpreted section 59-1-504 under rule 
R86M-8A of the Utah Administrative Code to 
mean that a party adversely affected by the 
action may appeal within thirty days after 
receipt of notice. Dusty's points out that rule 
14(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires a petition for judicial review to be filed 
within the time prescribed by statute and argues 
that the prescribing statute here is section 
59-1-504, as construed by the Commission in 
ruleR861-l-8A. 
Dusty's admits that the final Commission 
order was dated March 25, was mailed March 
26, and was received by Dusty's on March 30. 
Therefore, says Dusty's, pursuant to section 
59-1-504, the order became final thirty days 
after mailing, or on April 25, a Saturday. But, 
says Dusty's, because the Commission has 
specifically interpreted the statute as establishing 
the time for appeal to be within thirty days of 
receipt of notice, Dusty's petition was not due 
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until April 29. Ergo, says Dusty's, its filing on 
April 27 was timely, irrespective of whether the 
statute or the rule is applied. 
Dusty's then proceeds to interpret section 
63-46b-14(3)(a), which requires a petitioner to 
"file a petition for judicial review of final 
agency action within 30 days after the date that 
the order constituting the final agency action is 
issued." (Emphasis added.) Under that language, 
says Dusty's, the order was not issued until 
Saturday, April 25, and the petition for review 
was therefore not due until May 25. According 
to Dusty's, the crux of the statutory language is 
the word "issued," which is nowhere defined in 
the UAPA. 
The Commission takes the traditional 
approach. It argues that the procedures for 
agency action, agency review, and judicial 
review are all established by the UAPA. Section 
63-46b-14(3)(a) requires that judicial review be 
requested withm thirty days after the order on 
final agency action is issued. That date was 
March 25, and Dusty's petition was therefore 
due on Friday, April 24. Its April 27 filing was 
three (days late. The Commission believes that 
this court was therefore correct in dismissing 
Dusty's petition for lack of jurisdiction. And, it 
adds, the statutory time frame is the same as 
that required by rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
The Commission refers this court to Silva v. 
Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 
246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), where a petition for 
writ of review was mailed before, but received 
by the clerk of the court of appeals later than, 
thirty days after the date of the agency order. 
The court of appeals dismissed that petition as 
untimely. 
Finally, the Commission argues that Dusty's 
reliance on section 59-1-504 and rule R861 -1 -8A 
is misplaced. Both of those provisions have been 
superseded by the enactment of the UAPA, as 
set out m section 63-46b-22, which governs 
judicial review. The Commission believes that 
Dusty's fails to distinguish section 59-1-504, 
which the Commission says deals with notices to 
taxpayers regardmg the date taxes, interest, and 
penalties assessed by the Commission are due. 
It appears to this court that the statutory 
instructions are quite straightforward. In all 
administrative agency cases initiated after 
January 1, 1988, this court and the court of 
appeals have consistently been guided by the 
provisions of the UAPA in undertaking judicial 
reviews of final agency actions. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-460-22.' As the Commission correctly 
points out, under the UAPA, the time periods 
established for judicial review are strictly 
I construed: 
Nothing m this chapter may be interpreted 
to restrict a presiding officer, for good 
cause shown, from lengthening or 
shortening any time period prescribed m this 
chapter, except those time periods 
established for judi cial re view. 
Utah Code Ann. §63^6b-l (9) (emphasis added). 
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Dusty's petition for writ of review is governed 
by section 63-46b-14(3)(a): 
A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action within 30 days 
after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Dusty's argument that the date of issue is 
ambiguous and subject to several inconsistent 
interpretations is not persuasive. The 
Commission itself defined the date of issue when 
it postscnpted the order with the usual legend 
found in all Tax Commission orders: 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after 
the date of this order to file m Supreme 
Court a petition for judicial review. Utah 
C o d e A n n . § § 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 3 ( 1 ) , 
63-46b-!4(2)(a). 
The Commission chose (he date of the order as 
the date of issue. It accorded Dusty's notice of 
(he time limitations, and the chosen procedure 
was well within the bounds of due process 
notions and the Commission's discretion. Most 
importantly, it gave Dusty's actual and 
constructive notice, and Dusty's ignored that 
notice at its penl. 
For Dusty's future guidance and the guidance 
of all those who petition for judicial review from 
agency action, we hold that the date the order 
constituting the final agency action issues is the 
date the order bears on its face. Support for that 
conclusion is found in the UAPA itself. Section 
63-46b-212 governs agency action on declaratory 
orders. After receiving petitions for declaratory 
orders, agencies may issue written orders. 
Copies of all orders issued in response to 
requests for declaratory proceedings must be 
mailed promptly to petitioners or other parties. 
Inasmuch as declaratory orders have the same 
status and binding effect as any other orders 
issued in an adjudicative proceeding, it follows 
that the differentiation between issuance and 
mailing may not be limited to declaratory orders 
alone. 
We now address Dusty's main point, that its 
petition for judicial review must be governed by 
section 59-1-504 and rule R861-1-8A in isolation 
from the UAPA. 
Part 5 of chapter 1, title 59, deals with 
petitions for redetermination of deficiencies 
before the Commission. Requests for 
redetermination are for agency action, not for 
judicial review. §59-1-501. Once the 
Commission has determined a deficiency, the 
assessed amount becomes payable within thirty 
days from the date of mailing of the notice of 
demand from the Commission. §59-1-503. 
Section 59 1-504 reads as follows* 
The action of the commission on the 
tax-payer's petition for redetermination of 
deficiency shall be final 30 days after the 
date of mailing of the commission's notice 
of agency action. All tax, interest, and 
penal-ties are due 30 days from the date of 
mail-mg, unless the taxpayer seeks judicial 
review.3 
(Emphasis added.) 
The authority to redetermine deficiencies lies 
with the Commission, which allows taxpayers 
thirty days after mailing to remit amounts due. 
If the taxpayer disputes the redetermined 
amount, payment is suspended, and the taxpayer 
deposits the disputed amount instead, as set out 
in section 59-1-505. Section 59-1-504 does not 
contain time limitations for judicial review. 
They are dictated by section 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
Rule R861-1-8A of the Administrative Code,4 
as written, purports to govern appeals from 
informal adjudicative proceedings, pursuant to 
section 59-1-602, and is therefore irrelevant to 
the case before us.5 Another rule, not cited by 
Dusty's, does apply to these proceedings. Rule 
R861-1-5A of the Utah Administrative Code 
provides in relevant part: 
M. Orders The Commission will issue a 
written order after adjudicatory proceedings 
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 
63-460-10.6 
Section 63-46b-10 dictates procedures required 
to be taken by the presiding officer in formal 
adjudicative proceedings, which include 
statements of findings, conclusions, reasoning, 
relief, notice of right to apply for 
reconsideration, and notice of right for judicial 
review as well as the time limitation applicable 
to that review. 
The Commission's notice to Dusty's that its 
petition for judicial review would have to be 
perfected within thirty days of the Commission's 
order was proper under that administrative rule, 
and the rule is within the scope and authority of 
the statute to which it refers. 
To summarize, Dusty's time to seek judicial 
review in this court was prescribed by section 
63-46b-14(3), requiring it to file its petition for 
judicial review within thirty days after the order 
constituting final agency action was issued. The 
order was issued on the date it bore on its face. 
Section 59-1-504 does not govern petitions for 
judicial review, and rule R861-1-8A does not 
apply. 
The motion to reinstate the petition for review 
is denied 
1. 63-4<>b-22. Transition procedures. 
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency 
review, and judicial review contained in this 
chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced by or before an agency 
on or after January 1, 1988 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, 
agency review, and judicial review that are in 
effect on December 31, 1987, govern all agency 
adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before 
an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even 
if those proceedings are still pending before an 
agency or a court on January 1, 1988 
2. 63-46b-21. Declaratory orders. 
(6)(a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory 
order, the agency may issue a written order[ ] 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to 
a request for a declaratory proceeding shall be 
mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other 
parties 
(d) A declaratory order has the same status 
and binding effect as any other order issued in an 
adjudicative proceeding 
(Emphasis added ) 
3 . Section 59-1-504 was amended in 1987 in 
conjunction with the enactment of the UAPA, and the 
italicized language replaced previous language "unless 
taxpayer files within that period an appeal with the tax 
division of district court as provided by Part 6, 
Chapter 1, Title 59 " 1987 Utah Laws ch 161, §213 
The Commission infers from this amendment, 
correctly, we believe, that the legislature was aware of 
the conflicting tune provisions and brought them in 
line with the UAPA As it is now written, 
section 59-1-504 applies only to proceedings before 
the agency 
4. R861-1-8A. Appeal Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 59-1-602, 59-1-505. 
A Time of Appeal Within 30 days after 
receipt of notice of any order of the Commission, 
any party adversely affected thereby may appeal 
the order to the proper judicial authority If an 
appeal is not timely filed, the order becomes final 
at the end of the 30-day period Copies of such 
appeal shall be served upon the Commission and 
upon the Office of the Attorney General 
5. Without ruling on the issue, we agree with Dusty's 
that the rule does not appear to track any statute 
insofar as it purports, without statutory authority, to 
extend the time for appeal to thirty days after receipt 
of notice of the Commission's order The authority of 
administrative agencies to promulgate rules and 
regulations "is limited to those regulations which are 
consonant with the statutory framework, and neither 
contrary to the statute nor beyond its scope " 
Crowther v Nationwide Mut Ins Co , 762 P 2d 
1119, 1122 (Utah Ct App 1988) (citing LotUieed 
Aircraft v Tax Comm'n, 566 P 2d 1249 (Utah 1977)) 
6. 63-46b-10. Procedures for formal 
adjudicative proceedings—Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, 
or after the filing of any post-hearing papers 
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the 
time required by any applicable statute or rule of 
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and 
issue an order that includes 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence 
of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on 
facts officially noted, 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law, 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding 
officer's decision, 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the 
agency, 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for 
reconsideration, 
(0 a notice of any right to administrative or 
judicial review of the order available to aggrieved 
parties, and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any 
reconsideration or review 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
Reed Dwane HUNT, 
Deceased. 
No. 890469 
FILED: November 5, 1992 
Fifth District, Iron County 
The Honorable J. Phillip Eves 
ATTORNEYS: 
Keith F . Oehler, Cedar City, for the Estate 
and Richard L. Hunt 
Lyle R. Drake, St George , for Dawna B . 
Bool, Charlene Brown, Jefferson D. 
Goulette 
Th i s opin ion is subject to revis ion before 
publ ica t ion in the Pacific R e p o r t e r . 
H O W E , Associate Chief Ju s t i ce : 
This is an appeal from an order construing the 
last will and testament of Reed Dwane Hunt, 
deceased, and determining his heirs . The trial 
court concluded that the will failed to dispose of 
any assets of the deceased and directed that his 
assets be distnbuted to his heirs as determined 
by the in testate succession statutes. 
Reed Dwane Hunt died on December 3 , 1988, 
without a surviving wife, children, or parents. 
He had four stepchildren whom he had not 
adopted. His nearest heirs a ie two nieces, 
Dawna W. Bool and Charlene Brown, and a 
nephew, Jefferson D Goulette, appellees herein. 
One day before his death, the deceased executed 
a preprinted will form on which he had inserted 
three typewritten paragraphs. 
In the first paragraph, the deceased declared 
that he was of sound mind and was acting free 
of any duress and that he revoked all pr ior wills. 
The second and third paragraphs of the will 
provided. 
Second: I declare that 1 am a single man, 
and that 1 have four (4) stepchildren. 
Richard L. Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt , 
Denice M a n e Buckley, and Dennis Ray 
Hunt. If, at any t ime, any person shall be 
established by a Court of Law to be a child 
of mine, then I give and bequeath to each 
such person the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) 
and no more. 
Third: 1 have intentionally and with full 
knowledge omitted to provide for any and 
all of my heirs and next of kin who are not 
specifically mentioned herein, and 1 hereby 
generally and specifically disinherit each, 
any and all persons whomsoever claiming to 
be or who may be lawfully determined to be 
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APPENDIX I 
Rules 
Rule 486-1-2(f), Utah Admin. Code 
Rule 486-1-2(g), Utah Admin. Code 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Code 
Rule 3(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Proc. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Proc. 
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Proc. 
Rule 14(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Proc. 
Rule 36, Utah Rules of Appellate Proc. 
Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Proc. 
Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proc. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Proc. 
Rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proc. 
Rule 5(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Proc. 
Anti-Discrimination R486-M 
R475-4M. Baas Period Wages 
The wages used for the base period will be those 
wages earned during the first four of the last Ave 
completed quarters prior to the injury, regardless of 
the effective date of the claim. 
19tT 35-4-4.5 
R486. Anti-Discrimination 
R4M.1. ABfl-DboltoiatlkMi Dtrisfcrn RegalatioM Issued 
Parswut fe Scctkms 34-35-M2) SJKJ 7-0-4) LUJi 
Aio*DiscrtelMUoa Act of 1965, as Aneaded 
R4J42. Pre-i^elonMat laqoiry Guide 
R4S43. No*«ltsrTt«isHttto» CUMIC to be wed !• Contracts 
Eetered i»to by the State of Utah aad Hs Ageactes 
R4S4-4. Adverttsiag 
R4S4-5. Emptoymeat Agemcies 
R4S6-*. Regulation of Practice aad Procedure oa 
Employer Reports aad Records 
R486-1. Anti-Discrimination Division 
Regulations Issued Pursuant to Sections 
34-35-5-(2) and 7-<!-4) Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as 
Amended 
R4S4-M. DefiaitioBS 
R434-1-2. Procedares-Cbarges aail Iavestigitorv File 
R4S6-1-3. Procedures - Initial Decisionmaking aad 
Review 
R4S4-1-4. Procedares-HeaHats 
R486-1-1. Definitions 
The Following Definitions are in addition to the 
statutory definitions specified in U.C.A. 34-35-2. 
(a) *Law" means the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Vet of 1965, prohibiting discriminatory or unlawful 
rmployment practices. 
(b) "Investigator* shall mean the individual desi-
gnated by the Commission, or Director to investi-
ate complaints alleging discriminatory or prohibited 
mployment practices. 
(c) He, His, Him or Himself* shall refer to either 
!X. 
(d) "Handicap* means a physical or mental imp-
irment which substantially limits one or more of an 
tdividual's major life activities. 
(1) Being regarded as having a handicap is equi-
ilent to being handicapped or having a handicap. 
(2) Having a record of an impairment substantia 
ly limiting one or more major life activities is 
[uivalent to being handicapped or having a hand-
»P. 
(3) Major life activity means functions such as 
ring for one's self, performing manuar tasks, 
liking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, lear-
ig, and employment. 
(4) An individual will be considered substantially 
lited in the major life activity of employment or 
trkmg if the individual is likely to experience dif-
ulty ui securing, retaining or advancing in empl-
ment because of a handicap. 
5) Has a record of such an impairment means 
i a history of, or has been regarded as having, a 
ntal or physical impairment that substantially 
its one or more major life activity. 
6) Is regarded as having an impairment means (a) 
a physical or mental impairment that does not 
stantially limit major life activities but that is 
treated as constituting such a limitation; (b) has a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits major life activities only at a result of the 
attitudes of others toward such as impairment; or 
(c) has none of the impairments listed in the defin* 
ition of physical or mental impairmittl above but if 
treated as having such an impairment. 
(e) 'Qualified handicapped individual* mean* a 
handicapped individual who with reasonable acco-
mmodation can perform the essential functions of 
the job in question. 
(f) 'Reasonable Accommodation* For the purpose 
of enforcement of these rules and regulations the 
following criteria will be utilized to* determine a 
reasonable accommodation. 
(1) An employer shall make reasonable accomnv 
odation to the known physical or mental limitations 
of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or 
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that 
the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of its program « 
(2) Reasonable accommodation for example may 
include: (a) making facilities used by the employees 
readily accessible to and usable, by handicapped 
individuals, and (b) job restructuring, modified 
work schedules, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, and other similar actions. 
(This will be handeled on a case by case basis) 
(3) In determining pursuant to paragraph (1) of 
this section whether an accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of an 
employer's, factors to be considered include: 
(A) The overall size of the employers program 
with respect to number of employees, number and 
type of facilities, and size of budget: 
(B) The type of the employers operation, inclu-
ding the composition and structure of the employers: 
workforce; and 
(C) The nature and cost of the accommodation. 
needed. 
(4) An employer may not deny an employment 
opportunity to a qualified handicapped employee or 
applicant if the basis for the denial is the need to 
make reasonable accommodation to the physical or 
mental limitations of the employee or applicant. 
(g) With respect to the definition of sexual hara-
ssment, the Anti-Discrimination Division adopts 
the federal EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment 
as specified in 29 CFR Section 1604.11 (1985) as 
amended. 
R4S6-1-2. rVocedmes-Charges aad Investigatory 
File 
COMPLAINTS 
The following rules pertain to the procedures' 
specified in U.C.A. 34-35-1.1 
(a) Charges shall be filed in writing on forms 
provided by the Division. The charges shall be' 
signed and verified before a notary public or any 
other person authorized by law to administer oaths 
and take acknowledgments. 
(b) The charges filed shall contain the following: 
(1) The name and address of the party or parties 
complaining of the discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice. 
(2) The name (so far as it can be determined) and 
address of the party or parties alleged to have 
committed the discriminatory or prohibited emplo-
yment practice. 
(3) A concise statement pertaining to the alleged 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, 
including the name of the individual who committed 
€»CO 
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Rule 2. Suspension of rules. 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own 
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of 
Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or provisions of 
any of these rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case 
in accordance with its direction. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is court. If the motions are not filed in a timely 
added to the list of those rules that the appel- manner, the appellant may not take advantage 
late court may not suspend The former list of of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the dispo-
rules that the appellate court could not sus- sition of the motion to file the appeal. Both 
pend concerned procedures and time limits appellate courts treat the failure to file post-
that confer jurisdiction upon the court Under judgment motions in a timely manner as a ju-
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed risdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652 
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Timely filing. sion of the time limitation contained in Rule 
When a motion for summary disposition was 10, Utah R. App P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen- 1142 (Utah Ct. App 1990). 
TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order ^and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
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(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal slj^ll pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together 
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the 
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed 
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identi-
fied as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The designa-
tion of parties is changed to conform to the des-
ignation of parties in the federal appellate 
courts. 
The rule is amended to make clear that the 
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-ap-
peal" does not eliminate liability for payment 
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the 
order of filing, the cross-appellant would have 
been the appellant and so should be required to 
pay the established fees. 
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, ap-
peals from, § 78-4-11. 
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120. 
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of record. 
Attorney fees. 
Denial of intervention. 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Filing fees. 
Filing of notice. 
Final order or judgment. 
Judgment nunc pro tunc. 
Motion to strike. 
New trial. 
Partial judgment. 
Postjudgment orders. 
Purpose of notice. 
Review in equity cases. 
Summary judgment. 
Unsigned minute entry. 
Cited. 
Absence of record. 
There was nothing for the court to review 
where the alleged error was not made part of 
the record. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, 
Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). 
Attorney fees. 
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees 
by law, he was entitled to attorney fees in-
curred on appeal in defending his judgment 
without the necessity of having to file a cross 
appeal. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981); Wallis v. Thomas, 
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Denial of intervention. 
Order denying with prejudice an application 
for intervention was appealable. Tracy v. Uni-
versity of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1980). 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on 
the merits of the issues under Rule 4Kb), 
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commission, or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate 
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state 
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency, 
commission, board, or officer of the state which is inconsistent with one or 
more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules 
shall apply to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to 
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as 
established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure and abbreviated Utah R. App. P. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- court" in Subdivision (a) and "administrative 
ment, effective October 1, 1992, substituted agency, commission, or board" for "tribunal" in 
"trial court" for "district, juvenile, or circuit Subdivision (b). 
TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
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(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docket-
ing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon 
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of 
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appel-
lant, such name shall be added to the title. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1,1992, inserted "and a 
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certifi-
cation by the clerk that the bond has been 
filed" and made minor stylistic changes in Sub-
division (g). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Cited. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Post-judgment motions. 
In accord with fourth paragraph in bound 
volume. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 
182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 
P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filled with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court v/ithin 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Attorney fees. Premature notice. 
Cross-appeal. Reconsideration of order. 
Extension of time to appeal. Timelnness of notice. 
Filing of notice. — —Date of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. Cited. 
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the clerk of the trial court to retain the record or parts thereof subject to the 
request of the appellate court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit a 
copy of the order and of the index and the portion of the record not retained by 
the trial court to the clerk of the appellate court. 
(d) Record for preliminary hearing in appellate court. If prior to the 
time the record is transmitted the record is required in the appellate court, 
the clerk of the trial court at the request of any party or of the appellate court 
shall transmit to the appellate court such parts of the original record as 
designated. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The amend- Until satisfactory arrangements for payment 
ment keeps the requirement that the court re- have been made, the reporter is under no obli-
porter acknowledge the receipt of the request gation to prepare the transcript, 
for transcript. Formerly, that acknowledgment Rule 12 is amended to impose upon the court 
was to appear at the foot of the request itself. reporters the same standard of'good cause' and 
Rule 12 now treats the acknowledgment as a
 t n e 8 a m e procedures now applicable to parties 
separate document. The content of the ac- in seeking an extension of time for preparation 
knowledgment includes a statement regarding
 Qf t n e transcript. 
the satisfactory arrangement for payment. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 619 
Error § 439 el seq. to 633. 
C.J.S. — 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error 
§§ 1082 to 1095. 
Rule 13. Notice of filing by clerk of appellate court. 
Upon receipt of the index transmitted by the clerk of the trial court pursu-
ant to Rule 12(b)(1), or Rule 12(b)(2), or Rule 11(f), the clerk of the appellate 
court shall file the index and shall immediately give notice to all parties of the 
date on which it was filed and the date on which the appellant's brief is due 
pursuant to Rule 26. 
TITLE III. 
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMIS-
SIONS, AND COMMITTEES. 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention. 
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order 
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or 
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commis-
sion, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time 
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order. 
The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, 
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The 
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petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the re-
spondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each 
case, the agency shall be named respondent, The State of Utah shall be 
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated 
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the 
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they 
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single 
petitioner. 
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for 
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate 
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing 
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by 
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the pro-
ceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state 
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of 
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding 
who have been served. 
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under 
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties 
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise 
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which 
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS service of a petition for review or notice of ap-
peal on an opposing party does not substitute 
Means of filing petition. for nor accomplish the act of filing that appeal 
Time for filing. with the clerk. Silva v. Department of Emp. 
M . -... 4... Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Means of filing petition. ^ 
Commencing petitioner's appeal requires fll- Time for filing. 
ing the petition with the clerk. Filing a docu- The appeal time commences when the final 
ment requires that the document be deposited agency order issues and not when allegedly re-
with the court clerk, and not with the post of- ceived by a party. 
fice or other means of delivery. Silva v. Depart- The 30-day time period for filing an appeal is 
ment of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. not extended because the agency's decision was 
1990). mailed to petitioner and was not received by 
Service upon counsel or other parties is re- petitioner until days after its service. Silva v. 
quired by this rule, and failure to do so may be Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah 
grounds for appropriate sanctions. However, Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administra- tion to challenge zoning board decision (as ag-
tive Law § 553 et seq. grieved party), 8 A.L.R.4th 1087. 
A.L.R. - Court review of bar examiners' de- . St*nfntg o f 2 0 n i ,n g b o a r d , o f ^ P P ^ l s o r 8 i m i" 
. ., . .. on A T o OJ la** body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13 
cision on applicant s examination, 39 A.L.R.3d A L R 4th 1 ISO 
' Judicial review of administrative ruling af-
Standingof civic or property owners' associa- fecting conduct or outcome of publicly regu-
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otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in 
the absence of a request for an answer. 
(b) Form of petition; length. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by 
Rule 27 and copies shall be served and filed as prescribed by Rule 26. Except 
by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response requested by 
the court shall not exceed 15 pages. 
(c) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the 
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may 
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such 
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the partic-
ular case. 
(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are 
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing 
will not be received by the clerk. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
substantially redrafted to provide definitions sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de- first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
lays and frivolous appeals. the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and 
must award damages. This is in keeping with State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the law of these cases, appointed coun-
However, the amount of damages — single or sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
to make express the authority of the court to peal. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 829 
Error S§ 978 to 984. to 835. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 1408 
to 1452. 
Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur. 
(a) Date of issuance. The remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after 
the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, the 
remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order dispos-
ing of the petition. The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, 
enlarged, or shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of 
the court, any direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall 
constitute the remittitur. 
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending review. A stay or superse-
deas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application for review may be 
granted on motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of the remittitur or 
for approval of a supersedeas bond or for an order suspending, modifying, 
restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must 
ordinarily be made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision 
appealed from. A motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court, 
but the motion shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is 
not practicable, or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a 
motion or has failed to afford the relief which the movant requested, with the 
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reasons given by the court rendering the decision for its action. Reasonable 
notice of the motion shall be given to all parties. The period of the stay, 
supersedeas or injunction shall be for such time as ordered by the court up to 
and including the final disposition of the application for review. If the stay, 
supersedeas, or injunction is granted until the final disposition of the applica-
tion for review, the party seeking the review shall, within the time permitted 
for seeking review, file with the clerk of the court which entered the decision 
sought to be reviewed, a certified copy of the notice of appeal, petition for writ 
of certiorari, or other application for review, or shall file a certificate that such 
application for review has been filed. Upon the filing of a copy of an order of 
the reviewing court dismissing the appeal or denying the petition for a writ of 
certiorari, the remitti tur shall issue immediately. A bond or other security on 
such terms as the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to 
the grant or continuance of relief under this paragraph. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Counsel from the entry of the decision of the Court of 
should note that the petition for certiorari Appeals, the motion for the stay must be filed 
alone is not sufficient to stay the judgment of within 14 days of the entry of the decision of 
the Court of Appeals. Counsel must also file a the Court of Appeals or within five days of the 
motion to stay the remittitur or for an injunc-
 e n t r y Gf a decision regarding a motion for re-
tion or supersedeas. Although the time for fil- hearing, 
ing the petition for writ of certiorari is 30 days 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 748 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur . 2d Appeal and C.J .S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 1869 
Error § 939 to 945. to 1871 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Er ro r* 3 1140. 
Rule 37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal. 
(a) Suggestion of mootness. It is the duty of each party at all times dur-
ing the course of an appeal to inform the court of any circumstances which 
have transpired subsequent to the filing of the appeal which render moot one 
or more of the issues raised. If a party determines that one or more issues 
have been rendered moot, the party shall forthwith advise the court by filing a 
"suggestion of mootness" in the form of a motion under Rule 23. If the parties 
to the appeal agree as to the mootness of an issue, a stipulation to that effect 
should be filed, and unless otherwise directed by the court, the appeal will 
then proceed as to the remaining issues; if all issues in the appeal are mooted 
and the parties stipulate thereto, the suggestion of mootness shall be pre-
sented to the court pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this rule. 
(b) Voluntary dismissal. If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding 
shall sign and file with the clerk an agreement that the proceeding be dis-
missed, specifying the terms as to payment of costs and shall pay whatever 
fees are due, the clerk shall enter an order of dismissal, unless otherwise 
directed by the court. An appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant 
upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court. 
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(d) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are 
not timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing 
will not be received by the clerk. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, in Subdivision 
(b), deleted "and copies shall be served and 
filed as prescribed by Rule 26" from the end of 
the first sentence and added the second and 
third sentences. 
Rule 36. Issuance of remittitur. 
(a) Date of issuance. 
(1) In the Supreme Court the remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days 
after the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, 
the remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order 
disposing of the petition. 
(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue imme-
diately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or 
shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of the 
court, any direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall 
constitute the remittitur. 
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending application for review to 
the Supreme Court of the United States. A stay or supersedeas of the 
remittitur or an injunction pending application for review may be granted on 
motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of the remittitur or for ap-
proval of a supersedeas bond or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, 
or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be 
made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision appealed from. A 
motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court, but the motion 
shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is not practicable, 
or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a motion or has failed 
to afford the relief which the movant requested, with the reasons given by the 
court rendering the decision for its action. Reasonable notice of the motion 
shall be given to all parties. The period of the stay, supersedeas or injunction 
shall be for such time as ordered by the court up to and including the final 
disposition of the application for review. If the stay, supersedeas, or injunction 
is granted until the final disposition of the application for review, the party 
seeking the review shall, within the time permitted for seeking the review, 
file with the clerk of the court which entered the decision sought to be re-
viewed, a certified copy of the notice of appeal, petition for writ of certiorari, or 
other application for review, or shall file a certificate that such application for 
review has been filed. Upon the filing of a copy of an order of the reviewing 
court dismissing the appeal or denying the petition for a writ of certiorari, the 
remittitur shall issue immediately. A bond or other security on such terms as 
the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to the grant or 
continuance of relief under this paragraph. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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wise agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate appellants support the 
same argument, care shall be taken to avoid duplication of argument. 
(f) Non-appearance of parties. If the appellee fails to appear to present 
argument, the court will hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present. 
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on behalf of the 
appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the 
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument. 
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the parties, a case may be 
submitted for decision on the briefs, but the court may direct that the case be 
argued. 
(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; removal. If physical exhibits 
other than documents are to be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to 
have them placed in the courtroom before the court convenes on the date of 
the argument. After the argument, counsel shall remove the exhibits from the 
courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If exhibits are not reclaimed by 
counsel within a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall 
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk shall think best. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The former The rule incorporates the oral argument pri-
practice was to presume that argument was only classification formerly found in the ad-
waived unless requested. The amendments ministrative orders of the Supreme Court, 
change the practice to presume that argument 
is requested unless expressly waived. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, Error §§ 697 to 699. 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. C.J.S, — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1401. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 824. 
Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of deci-
sion. 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or oth-
erwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact 
in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to 
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the 
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the 
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as 
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be 
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine 
all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and neces-
sary to the final determination of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a 
new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of 
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order af-
firmed or modified shall be executed. 
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judg-
ment, decree, or order is reversed, modified, or affirmed, the reasons shall be 
stated concisely in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice or judge 
concurring or dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the 
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ance of additional time must be made by motion filed reasonably in advance of 
the date fixed for hearing. 
(d) Order and content of argument. The appellant is entitled to open and 
conclude the argument. The opening argument shall include a fair statement 
of the case. Counsel will not be permitted to read at length from briefs, records 
or authorities. 
(e) Cross and separate appeals. A cross or separate appeal shall be ar-
gued with the initial appeal at a single argument, unless the court otherwise 
directs. If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff in the action below shall 
be deemed the appellant for the purpose of this rule unless the parties other-
wise agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate appellants support the 
same argument, care shall be taken to avoid duplication of argument. 
(0 Non-appearance of parties. If the appellee fails to appear to present 
argument, the court will hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present. 
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on behalf of the 
appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the 
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument. 
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the parties, a case may be 
submitted for decision on the briefs, but the court may direct that the case be 
argued. 
(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; removal. If physical exhibits 
other than documents are to be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to 
have them placed in the courtroom before the court convenes on the date of 
the argument. After the argument, counsel shall remove the exhibits from the 
courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If exhibits are not reclaimed by 
counsel within a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall 
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk shall think best. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- mer Subdivision (b)(10), listing "petitions for 
ment, effective October I, 1992, added "with review of Public Service Commission orders," 
priority to cases in which the defendant is in- and redesignated the following subdivisions ac-
carcerated" to Subdivision (b)(2), deleted for- cordingly. 
Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of deci-
sion. 
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or oth-
erwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact 
in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to 
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the 
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the 
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as 
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be 
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine 
all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and neces-
sary to the final determination of the case. 
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a 
new trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of 
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order af-
firmed or modified shall be executed. 
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RULE 
71A Process in behalf of and against persons 
not parties 
7IB Proceedings where parties not sum-
moned 
PART IX APPEALS. 
72 through 76 [Repealed J 
PART X DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS 
77 District courts and clerks 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F R C P , 
except that it has been adapted to procedure of 
this state 
Cross-References . — Children's cases 
deemed civil proceedings, § 78-3a-44 
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected 
by rules, Rule 82 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability 
—Administrative body 
Federal rules 
Noncompliance 
Cited 
Applicability. 
—Administrative body. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
RULE 
78 to 80 {Repealed I 
PART XI GENERAL PROVISIONS 
81 Applicability of rules in general 
82 Jurisdiction and venue unaffected 
83 (Repealed 1 
84 Forms 
85 Title 
APPENDIX OF FORMS 
INDEX TO RULES 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district 
courts, circuit courts, and justice courts, Chap-
ters 2, 2a, 3, 4, 5 of Title 78 
Supreme Court's rulemaking power, § 78-2-
4 
United States, execution of process on land 
acquired by, §** 63-8-1, 63-8-3 
apply to a proceeding before an administrative 
body seeking to regulate activities burdened 
with a public interest Entre Nous Club v 
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P 2d 670 (1955) 
Federal rules. 
Since these rules were fashioned after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to 
examine decisions under the federal rules to 
determine the meanings thereof Winegar v 
Slim Olson, Inc , 122 Utah 487, 252 P 2d 205 
(1953) (construing Rule 41) 
PART I. 
SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the Supreme 
Court, the district courts, the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state 
of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cogni-
zable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as 
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legisla-
ture and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. 
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also 
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in 
the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when 
the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which 
event the former procedure applies. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts within state for purposes of state "closed-door" 
§ 143; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to statute barring unqualified or unregistered 
352; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 8, 9. foreign corporation from local courts — modern 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 54 et seq.; 71 cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 466. 
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408 to 412; 72 C.J.S. Pro- Key Numbers. — Courts •=» 21 et seq.; 
cess § 3. Pleading «=» 331; Process *=» 4 to 6. 
A.L.R. — What constitutes doing business 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and 
served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the sum-
mons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of 
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely 
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or 
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within 
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or 
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the 
court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the action, and the 
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the 
name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and 
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time 
within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, 
and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by 
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the 
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the 
court within ten days of service. If service is made by publication, the sum-
mons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other 
relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this 
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or 
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the 
marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of 
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), (3) 
or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to 
the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwell-
ing house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or 
the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process; 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy 
to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none 
can be found within the state, then to any person having the care and 
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control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service 
the infant is employed; 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or 
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person 
and to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed and in 
the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, 
custody or control of the person; 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated 
by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the 
person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be served, 
or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the indi-
vidual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, 
promptly deliver the process to the individual served; 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a man-
aging or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by 
law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by 
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a 
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within the 
state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, 
an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does busi-
ness within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of 
such office or place of business; 
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy thereof to 
the recorder; 
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of such 
county; 
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy to 
the superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board; 
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be 
brought against the state, by delivering a copy to the attorney general 
and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and 
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any 
public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy to 
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secre-
tary. 
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a for-
eign country shall be made as follows: 
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for 
service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or 
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a corporation, 
partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a manag-
ing general agent; provided that such service be made by a person who is 
not a party to the action, not a party's attorney, and is not less than 18 
years of age, or who is designated by order of the court or by the foreign 
court; or 
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served as ordered by 
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the court. Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed 
in these rules for service within this state, or by the law of the foreign 
country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to sub-
part (3) of this subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed 
by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfac-
tory to the court, 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be 
served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, 
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to 
be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process 
may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service 
by publication, by mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit 
shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be 
served, or the circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the 
individual parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of 
process by publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, or 
by some combination of the above, provided that the means of notice employed 
shall be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the 
interested parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possi-
ble or practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the pro-
cess to be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed 
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with 
the process specified by the court. 
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the party 
serving the process shall file proof of service with the court promptly, and in 
any event within the time during which the person served must respond to the 
process, and proof of service must be made within ten days after such service. 
Failure to file proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In all 
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule 3(a)(2), the proof of service shall 
be made as follows: 
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or the dep-
uty of any of them, by certificate with a statement as to the date, place, 
and manner of service; 
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit with a statement as to the 
date, place, and manner of service, together with the affiant's age at the 
time of service; 
(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of the publisher or printer 
or that person's designated agent, showing publication, and specifying the 
date of the first and last publications; and an affidavit by the clerk of the 
court of a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the United 
States mail, if such mailing shall be required under this rule or by court 
order; 
(4) If served by United States mail, by the affidavit of the clerk of the 
court showing a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the 
United States mail, as may be ordered by the court, together with any 
proof of receipt; 
(5) By the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be 
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved. 
(i) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it 
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be 
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amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the 
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued. 
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the 
process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall state 
the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. 
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the 
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left 
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and 
shall sign his or her name thereto, and, if an officer, add his or her official 
title. 
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceed-
ing where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court 
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate 
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made 
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and 
shall be published in the English language. 
(Amended effective March 1, 1988; April 1, 1990.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4 con-
stitutes a substantia) change from prior prac-
tice. The rule modernizes and simplifies proce-
dure relating to service of process. Although 
this rule and Rule 3 retain the ten-day sum-
mons procedure for commencement of actions, 
this rule endeavors to make practice under the 
ten-day summons provision more consistent 
with practice in actions commenced by the fil-
ing of a complaint. The rule retains portions of 
prior Rule 4, adopts portions of the present fed-
eral Rule 4, and adopts entirely new language 
in other areas. The rule eliminates the state-
ment (appearing in paragraph (m) of the prior 
rule) that all writs and process may be served 
by any constable of the court. In the commit-
tee's view, this rule does not properly deal with 
the question of who may serve types of process 
other than the summons and complaint. In rec-
ommending the elimination of paragraph (m), 
the committee did not intend to change the law 
governing eligibility to serve such other pro-
cess. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph eliminates 
the prior rule's reference to the issuance of 
summonses. See paragraph (b). Otherwise the 
paragraph is identical to the former paragraph 
(a). 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph, a substantial 
change from the prior rule, requires that in an 
action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the sum-
mons, together with a copy of the complaint, 
must be served within 120 days of the filing of 
the complaint. The time period was borrowed 
from Rule 4(j), Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph makes minor 
revisions to the corresponding paragraph of the 
prior rule. In addition to data historically re-
quired to appear in the summons, the address 
of the court and information concerning the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney are also re-
quired. 
Paragraph (d). In prescribing the persons 
who may serve process, this paragraph elimi-
nates the prior rule's distinction between in-
state and out-of-state service. The paragraph is 
consistent with other changes in the rule de-
signed to simplify and unify practice for in-
state and out-of-state service. In order to be 
eligible to serve a summons or complaint, per-
sons who are not sheriffs or other law enforce-
ment personnel must be at least 18 years of age 
at the time of service. For eligibility to make 
service in a foreign country, see paragraph (f). 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph and para-
graphs (0 and (g) simplify, change and reorga-
nize the requirements for methods of service as 
they appeared in paragraphs (e) and (f) of the 
former rule. Subparagraph (e)(1) presents the 
general rule for personal service on individuals 
who are not infants, incompetent, or incarcer-
ated. Subparagraph (2) deals with service on 
infants and subparagraph (3) with service on 
incompetent persons. Subparagraphs (1), (2) 
and (3) are patterned after Rule 4(e), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (4) 
deals with service on persons who are incarcer-
ated or committed to the custody of a state in-
stitution. Subparagraph (5) deals with service 
on business entities. Subparagraphs (6) 
through (9) change and modernize service on 
political subdivisions of the state. Subpara-
graphs (10) and (11) provide for service on the 
state and its departments, agencies, boards 
and commissions with only minor changes 
from the prior rule. 
Paragraph (f). This paragraph provides sev-
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PART II. 
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF 
PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND 
ORDERS. 
Rule 4. Process. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability of rule. 
—Service on state agency. 
In an action against the Utah State Depart-
ment of Transportation, § 63-30-12, requiring 
notice both to the attorney general and the De-
partment, is applicable, not Subdivision (e)(ll) 
of this rule. Lamarr v. State DOT, 183 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 53 (Ct. App. 1992). 
PART III. 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of failure to deny. 
In an action for modification of the custody 
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropri-
ate for the trial court to rule on appellee's peti-
tion, absent any responsive pleading, and to 
accept the allegations in the petition as true in 
resolving the threshold requirement of 
whether appellant's circumstances had materi-
ally changed; however, it does not follow that 
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial 
court asked to render a judgment by default 
must first conclude that the uncontroverted al-
legations of an applicant's petition are, on their 
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid 
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v. 
Collard, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
—Standard. 
Cited. 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. 
—Standard. 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, the court must construe the com-
plaint in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his 
favor. Mounteer v. Power & Light Co., 823 
P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
Cited in Moffitt v. Barr, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 
71 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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were performed outside the state, 16 A.L.R.4th same proceeding in which abuse occurred — 
1318. state cases, 82 A.LR4th 1115. 
Forum state's jurisdiction over nonresident Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 507, 
defendant in action based on obscene oi threat- Counties *=- 219, Municipal Corporations J> 
ening telephone call from out of state, 37 1029; Process «=» 21, 23, 24, 50 to 58, 63, 64, 82, 
A.L R.4th 852 84 to 1 LI, 127 to 153, 161 to 165, Schools and 
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim
 S c h o o l D l s t n c t 8 ^ 1 1 9 S t a t e b ^ 2 0 4 
for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in 
Rule 5, Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be 
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule 
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named 
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, 
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or posses-
sion of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be 
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made 
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the 
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by deliver-
ing a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no 
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a 
copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or 
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, 
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if 
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing. 
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be 
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney 
practicing in any of the courts of this state. 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are un-
usually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own 
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and re-
plies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-
claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the 
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Statutes 
{All from Utah Code Annotated} 
Sec. 63-46b-16(l) 
Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
Sec. 34-35-7.1(3)(b) 
Sec. 34-35-7.1(11)(b) 
Sec. 34-35-7.1(1)(a) 
Sec. 34-35-7.1(9) 
Sec. 34-35-8 
Sec. 63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv) 
Sec. 63-46b-12(l)(a) 
Sec. 63-45b-22 
Sec. 63-46b-16 
Sec. 63-46b-16(4) 
63-46b-16 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25. 63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection (l)(a) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
that final agency action from informal adjudi- § 315
 m akes the act effective on January 1, 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1988. 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. the district court will no longer function as in-
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of elec-
tion. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial 
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per 
annum or fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge 
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties 
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment hy ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local 
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "in-
formal adjudicative proceedings of the agen-
cies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" 
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsec-
tion (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) 
to (2>(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added 
"except those from the small claims depart-
ment of a circuit court" at the end of Subsec-
tion (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
April 25. 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsec-
tion (2)(i) 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote 
the phrase before "except" which had read "the 
final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of 
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" at the end of Subsection 
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); desig-
nated former Subsections (2Kb) to (2Kh) as 
Subsections (2)(c) to (2Ki); and substituted 
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capi-
tal degree felony" in present Subsection (2K0. 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g), 
which read "appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal 
conviction, except those involving a first de-
gree or capital felony" and made punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective 
April 23, 1990. inserted the subdivision desig-
nation (i) in Subsection (2Mb) and added Sub-
section (2)(b)(ii), and made related stylistic 
changes. 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "dis-
trict court" in Subsection (2Kf). 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16. 
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(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
bions of 
rdinary 
bo effect 
ction of 
lis prior 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, $ 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127, 
§ 11. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, in Subsection 
(4), deleted former Subsections (e) and (f), 
which read: "general water adjudication" and 
"taxation and revenue; and," respectively, 
making related changes; redesignated former 
Subsection (g) as Subsection (e); and made sty-
listic changes in Subsection (e). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Humphrey. 176 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8 (1991). 
CHAPTER 2a 
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•riginat-
lal adju-
tatute of 
rider the 
charge of 
first de-
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
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tion must prove that the stated reasons of an 
employer for passing her over were merely a 
pretext and not the real reason, it is the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion which she must 
carry. She is not required to establish intent as 
an element of her prima facie case. However, 
after her employer raises a genuine issue of 
fact by adducing legitimate reasons for its ac-
tion, the burden shifts back to the employee, 
requiring her to prove that a discriminatory 
reason was the basis for the employer's deci-
sion. University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 
736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987). 
Although a television station employee pre-
sented a prima facie case of age discrimination, 
her employer carried its burden of rebuttal by 
presenting legitimate reasons for not hiring 
her: Her unwillingness to follow orders, to fol-
low through, and to meet budget limitations as 
well as deadlines and her inability to work 
well with others. University of Utah v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987). 
Discrimination in rate of pay. 
Discrimination in rate of pay cannot be de-
termined solely on whether a person is doing 
the same work with the same degree of compe-
tence as other employees; classification, senior-
ity and degree of responsibility employee is re-
quired to assume must also be considered; po-
lice dispatcher who claimed she had been dis-
criminated against on basis of sex in that she 
received less pay than a regular policeman do-
ing the same work was not entitled to relief in 
view of the more stringent qualifications and 
training required of police officers and the var-
ied nature of their duties. Kopp v. Salt Lake 
City, 29 Utah 2d 170, 506 P.2d 809 (1973). 
Cited in Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83 
(Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Sex as a Bona Fide 
Occupational Qualification, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 
395. 
Brighnm Young Law Review. — Accom-
modation of Conscientious Objection to Abor-
tion: A Case Study of the Nursing Profession, 
1982 RY.U. L. Rev. 253. 
C.J.S. — 51B C.J.S. Labor Relations § 866. 
A.L.R. — Termination of employment be-
cause of pregnancy as affecting right to unem-
ployment compensation, 51 A.L.R.3d 254. 
Discipline or discharge for sexual conduct as 
violative of state fair employment laws, 47 
AL.R.4th 863. 
When is work environment intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive, so as to constitute sexual 
harassment in violation of Title VII of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as amended (42 USCS 
$ 2000e et seq.), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 252. 
Actions under Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (29 USCS §§ 621-634) challeng-
ing hiring or retirement practices in law en-
forcement employment, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 373. 
Who is "qualified" handicapped person pro-
tected from employment discrimination under 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USCS § 701 et 
seq.) and regulations promulgated thereunder, 
80 A.L.R. Fed. 830. 
Effect of mixed or dual motives in actions 
under Title VII (equal employment opportuni-
ties subchapter) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
USCS §§ 2000e et seq.), 83 A.L.R. Fed. 268. 
Actionability, under federal and state anti-
discrimination legislation, of foreign em-
ployer's discriminating in favor of foreign 
workers in hiring and other employment mat-
ters, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 114. 
Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «= 884, 
885. 
34-35-7. Repealed, 
Repeals. — Section 34-35-7 (L. 1969, ch. 85, 
§ 166; 1979, ch. 139, § 2; 1981, ch. 1, § 1), re-
lating to violations, complaints and procedure, 
was repealed by Laws 1985, ch. 189, § 5. 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim — 
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, 
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request shall be verified under oath or affirmation. 
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(c) A request shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged discrimi-
natory or prohibited employment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or 
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to 
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the commis-
sion a written charge asking the commission for assistance to obtain their 
compliance by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before an adjudicative proceeding is set or held, the commission 
shall assign an investigator to the charge to attempt a settlement be-
tween the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt 
impartial investigation of the allegations made in the charge. 
(c) During the investigation, the members of the commission and its 
staff may not disclose the information gathered during the investigation 
or the settlement efforts to any party not involved in the investigation or 
the charge itself. 
(d) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct 
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and 
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no 
prohibited employment practice has occurred. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the inves-
tigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to support 
the charge of discrimination or prohibited employment practice, the in-
vestigator shall formally report these findings t6 the commission. 
(b) (i) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the commission may 
issue an order dismissing the charge for no cause of action. 
(ii) The aggrieved party may petition the commission for reconsid-
eration. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the inves-
tigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support 
the charges of discrimination or prohibited employment practice, the in-
vestigator shall formally report these findings to the commission. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the commission may issue 
an order adopting the investigator's report. 
(c) The commission may order the parties to meet for conciliation dis-
cussions, with a designated employee of the commission present. 
(d) If these final conciliation discussions are unsuccessful, or if a party 
declines to participate in the conciliation discussions, an aggrieved party 
may file a request for reconsideration with the commission. 
(e) If the commission receives no timely request for reconsideration 
from the respondent, the commission may issue an order requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tices and provide relief to the charging party. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the 
matter may not participate in the hearing except as a witness, nor may he 
participate in the deliberations of the administrative law judge. 
(7) (a) The administrative law judge may advise either party appearing 
without representation that obtaining representation to present their 
case before the administrative law judge is advisable. 
(b) The administrative law judge may postpone the hearing to allow 
either party to obtain legal representation. 
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(8) The commission or the charging party may reasonably and fairly amend 
any charge, and the respondent may amend its answer. 
(9) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the administrative law judge 
finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice, the administrative law judge shall issue an order 
dismissing the action containing his findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
(b) If, the case is dismissed, the administrative law judge may recom-
mend that the respondent be reimbursed for his costs. 
(10) The commission may enact rules to govern, expedite, and effectuate 
these procedures and its own actions that do not violate the provisions of 
Chapter 46b, Title 63, or this chapter. 
(11) The procedures contained in this section and Section 34-35-8 are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination because of 
race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Sub-
sections (I), (3), (4) and (5), deleted former Sub-
sections (6), (7), (11) and (12) and redesignated 
the subsequent subsections accordingly; re-
wrote present Subsection (9); substituted "that 
do not violate the provisions of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, or this chapter" for "subject to the 
conditions and provisions of this chapter" in 
present Subsection (10); and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Procedure at hearing. 
Remedies of commission. 
Procedure at hearing. 
It is not improper for the complainant's case 
to be presented by the complainant personally 
or by counsel instead of an attorney or agent 
for the commission. Beehive Medical Elecs., 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1978). 
Remedies of commission. 
Under proper circumstances, payment in 
lieu of job reinstatement is a permissible affir-
mative action. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Damages recoverable for wrongful 
discharge of at-will employee, 44 A.L.R.4th 
1131. 
Rights of state and municipal public em-
ployees in grievance proceedings, 46 A.L.R.4th 
913. 
Reinstatement as remedy for discriminatory 
discharge or demonition under Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (29 USCS § 621 et 
seq.), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 575. 
34-35-8. Judicial review — Procedure. 
(1) Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final 
order of the commission, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain 
judicial review and the commission may obtain an order of court for its en-
forcement in a proceeding as provided in this section. 
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(2) The proceeding shall be brought in the district court of the district in 
which is located the county in which the alleged discriminatory or unfair 
employment practice which is the subject of the commission's order was com-
mitted, or in which any respondent required in the order to cease or desist 
from a discriminatory or unfair employment practice, or to take other affirma-
tive action, resides or transacts business. 
(3) The judicial review sought by the person or persons claiming to be 
aggrieved by a final order of the commission shall be initiated by filing in the 
district court not later than one month after actual service of a copy of the 
order of the commission on the aggrieved party or parties, a petition for a trial 
de novo in the district court. Within five days after the filing of the petition in 
the district court, the petitioner shall cause to be served upon the commission 
and upon all persons who appeared as adverse parties at any hearing or 
proceeding before the commission a copy of the petition for trial de novo in the 
district court. If the addresses of all adverse parties cannot be ascertained by 
the petition, the petitioner shall serve copies upon those parties in care of the 
commission. 
(4) The filing of the petition in the district court operates as a stay of 
enforcement of the order of the commission until or unless the district court 
dismisses the petition or enters a judgment upon a trial de novo in the district 
court. 
(5) The petition for a trial de novo shall specify the date of the order and the 
parties to the proceeding before the commission. Within 15 days after filing 
the petition the commission shall file in the district court where the petition 
has been filed the entire case file before the commission containing the formal 
complaint, the answer and all other documents and exhibits, together with a 
transcript of the hearing before the commission if any of the parties so re-
quire. The district court upon motion of any party to the proceeding in the 
district court may order the appearance of new parties and require any of the 
parties to file new pleadings or allow any amendment to pleadings, or expe-
dite discovery proceedings. 
(6) Upon the conclusion of a trial de novo in the district court or other 
proceedings which appropriately dispose of all issues of fact and of law, the 
district court shall enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment and 
decree, which are subject to enforcement upon the application of the commis-
sion or any party to the judgment. The parties may waive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The judgment entered in the district court supersedes any 
order made by the commission. 
(7) The judgment and order of the court are final, subject to review as 
provided by law. 
(8) The commission's copy of the testimony shall be available to all parties 
for examination at reasonable times, v/ithout cost, and for the purpose of 
judicial review of the commission's orders. 
(9) The commission may appear in court by its own attorney. 
(10) Proceedings in the district court shall be expedited at all stages to final 
judgment as far as consistent with justice to all interested parties. 
(11) If no proceeding to obtain judicial review is instituted by a complain-
ant or respondent within one month from the service of an order of the com-
mission pursuant to Section 34-35-7 [repealed], the commission may obtain a 
decree of the court for the enforcement of the order upon showing that respon-
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dent is subject to the jurisdiction of the commission and resides or transacts 
business within the county in which the petition for enforcement is brought. 
(12) The provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as applicable and 
not in conflict with this chapter, apply to proceedings in the courts under the 
provisions of this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-8, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 85, § 167; 1986, ch. 47, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment rewrote Subsection (7) and made various 
stylistic changes in the rest of the section. 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 34-35-7, re-
ferred to in Subsection (11), was repealed by 
Laws 1985, ch. 189, § 5. For present compara-
ble provisions, see § 34-35-7.1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
j ANALYSIS 
Jury trial. 
Remedies of district court. 
Trial de novo. 
Jury trial 
There is no right to a jury trial at trial de 
novo in the district court on appeal from com-
mission's decision on a sex discrimination in 
employment case. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53 (IHah 1978) 
Remedies of district court. 
District court on trial de novo has jurisdic-
tion to impose the same remedies granted by 
law to the industrial commission. Beehive 
Medical Elecs., Inc. v 
P.2d 53 (Utah 1978) 
Industria 1 Comm'n, 583 
Trial de novo. 
The legislature clearly intended that the 
court be the fact-finder on review. Thus, the 
findings of the commission are superseded by 
the findings of the district court, and no partic-
ular deference need be given to the former. 
University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n, 736 
P.2d 630 (Utah 1987). 
CHAPTER 36 
TRANSPORTATION OF WORKERS 
Section Section 
34-36-1. Motor vehicles of employers — Safe 34-36-3. 
maintenance and operation. 
34-36-2. Motor vehicles of employers — Rules 34-36 4. 
and regulations. 
Carriers and vehicles of I Inited 
States exempt. 
Agricultural workers exempt. 
34-36-1. Motor vehicles of employers — Safe maintenance 
and operation. 
Every motor vehicle furnished by an employer to be used to transport one or 
more workers to and from their places of employment shall be maintained in a 
safe condition and operated in a safe manner at all times, whether or not used 
on a public highway. 
History: C. 1953, 34-36-1, enacted by I 
1969, ch. 85, § 168. 
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History: C. 1953, 34-35-6, enacted by L. and inserted "or harass" near the middle of 
1969, ch. 85, § 165; 1971, ch. 73, § 10; 1973, Subsection (l)(c) and near the beginning of 
ch. 65, 5 1; 1975, ch. 100, § 1; 1979, ch. 136, Subsection (l)(f)(ii); inserted "pregnancy, 
§ 3; 1985, ch. 189, $ 3; 1985, ch. 203, § 1; childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions" in 
1987, ch. 206, 5 4; 1989, ch. 155, § 1. several places throughout the section; deleted 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
 a reference to Section 49-7a-39 in Subsection 
ment, effective April 24, 1989, inserted "ha-
 ( 4 ) ; a n d m a d e m i n o r 8 t H g t i c c h 
rass near the beginning of Subsection (l)(a)(i) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Accommodation requirement un- ship between supervisor and another, 86 
der state legislation forbidding job discrimina- A.L.R. Fed. 230. 
tion on account of handicap, 76 A.L.R.4th 310. Circumstances which warrant finding of con-
Handicap as job disqualification under state 8tructive discharge in cases under Age Dis-
legislation forbidding job discrimination on ac- crimination in Employment Act (29 USCS 
count of handicap, 78 A.L.R.4th 265.
 § § 6 2 i e t seq.), 93 A.L.R. Fed. 10. 
Discrimination "because of handicap" or "on
 W h e n d o e 8 a d v e r g e employment decision 
the basis of handicap under state statutes pro-
 b f l 8 e d o n n.g f o r e i a c c e n t c ( m 8 t i t u t e na_ 
hibiting job discrimination on account of hand-
 U o n a , ^ . ^ d i 8 c r i m i n a t i o n i n v i o l a t i o n o f Ti_ 
icap » i A.L,K.4tn 144^
 U e v n f c . v i l R . h t g A f 1 % 4 u g c s 
What constitutes handicap under state legis-
 c c OA__ . . * . A , „ „ , Qi_ 
lation forbidding job discrimination on account » ZOOOerf seq.) 104 A.L.R Fed. 816. 
of handicap, 82 A.L.R.4th 26. Protection of debtor from acts of discnmina-
Nature and burden of proof in Title VII ac- t i o n b v P r i v a t e e n t i t v a n d u n d e r § 5 2 5 ( b ) o f 
tion alleging favoritism in promotion or job as- Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS § 525(b)), 
signment due to sexual or romantic relation- 105 A.L.R. Fed. 555. 
34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim — 
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, 
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or 
affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed 
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or 
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to 
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the commis-
sion a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance to ob-
tain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceed-
ing, the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a 
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt 
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency 
action. 
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(c) The commissioit and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduc 
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, «i> 
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear tha! 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency 
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the inves 
tigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to support 
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set 
out in the request for agency action the investigate >r shall formally report 
these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a 
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an eviden 
tiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determi-
nation and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful ai id the inves-
tigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support 
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set 
out in the request for agency action, the Investigator shall formally report 
these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issi le a 
determination and order based on the investigator's report 
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within 
30 days of the date of the determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determi-
nation and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to cease 
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide re-
lief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the 
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he 
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the 
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, 
and the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made 
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officer finds that 
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the 
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed 
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a 
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to 
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide 
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relief to the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and bene-
fits, and attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all 
stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order 
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the 
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (ll)(a) is subject to judi-
cial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning proce-
dures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make 
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation, 
or proceeding before the commission except in the following: 
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may 
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and 
participation in proceedings before the commission. 
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the iden-
tities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed. 
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general 
or other legal representatives of the state or commission. 
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting require-
ments of the federal government. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy un-
der state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retal-
iation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, 
national origin, or handicap. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based 
upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continua-
tion of any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Divi-
sion in connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this 
subsection is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy 
provision set forth in Subsection (15). 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105; 1990, 
ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 188, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "for 
agency action" in Subsection (1Kb) and "for 
agency action made under this section" in Sub-
section (lKc); substituted "request for agency 
action" for "written charge" in Subsection (2), 
"a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudi-
cative proceeding, the commission shall 
promptly assign an investigator" for "an adju-
dicative proceeding is set or held, the commis-
sion shall assign an investigator to the charge" 
in Subsection (3)(a), and "all allegations made 
in the request for agency action" for "the alle-
gations made in the charge" in Subsection 
(3)(b); deleted former Subsection (3)(c), relating 
to the disclosure of information or settlement 
efforts; redesignated former Subsection (3)fd) 
as Subsection (3)(c); inserted Subsection (3)(d); 
and rewrote the remainder of the section to the 
extent that a detailed comparison would be im-
practicable. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, inserted "discriminatory or" near the end 
of Subsection (3)(c); added Subsection (4)(d); 
substituted all of the present language of Sub-
section (8)(a) beginning with "request" for "di-
rector's determination and ending the adjudi-
cative proceeding"; deleted "If a director's de-
termination is dismissed" at the beginning of 
Subsection (8Kb); added "and costs" at the end 
of Subsection (9); substituted "issued by the 
presiding officer" for "by the commission" in 
Subsection (ll)(a); rewrote Subsections (12) 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
and (13); and made minor changes in punctua-
tion and style throughout the section. 
ANAI ¥818 
Exclusive remedy. 
No independent cause of action found 
Exclusive remedy. 
Claims that assert a different injury than 
this statute covers, such as intentional tort 
claims, and perhaps certain state constitu-
tional claims, are not necessarily foreclosed by 
the exclusive remedy provision of Subsection 
(11) if an independent cause of action exists 
A.L.R. — Award of front pay under state job 
discrimination statutes, 74 A.L.R.4th 746. 
Damages and other relief under state legis-
34-35-8. Repealed. 
Repeals. — 1 *aws 1990, ch. 63, § 3 repeals 
§ 34-35-8, as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 
47, § 15, relating to judicial review, effective 
ANAI YSIS 
Purpose. 
Refusal to submit to polygraph test. 
Purpose. 
Subsection (2) protects employees or poten-
tial employees from termination where the em-
ployer informs them of the possibility of on-
going or future surreptitious examinations and 
the applicants or employees refuse consent or 
outside this chapter for such claims >.H.i*r> 
Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp .'te.: ;- • •• 
1990). 
No independent cause of action found. 
Former county employee's claims of sexual 
harassment and discrimination were pre-
empted by this chapter, even though they were 
cast as violations of other statutes or the Utah 
Constitution. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 
F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990). 
lation forbidding job discrimination on account 
of handicap, 78 A.L.R.4th 435. 
April 2J, 1990 For present comparable provi-
Hitiiia, m;t* § 34- 35-7 1 
cooperation with such practices. Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 
1989) 
Refusal to submit to polygraph t e s t 
Subsection (2) applies only to surreptitious 
deception detection examinations. This does 
not include polygraph examinations. Berube v 
Fashion Centre, I ,td., 771 P.2d 1033 (1 J tan 
1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CHAPTER 37 
DECEPTION DETECTION EXAMINERS 
nation of act. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of lie delet'tor lest attorney disciplinary procerriinu Vf "'I 1  ill -lllli 
results, or of offer or refuuu) IO take lesl, in hid 
34-37-16. Surreptitious examinations prohibited. 
NOTES TO DKCISIONS 
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History: C. 1953, 63-46b-ll, enacted by L. der," and added Subsections (b) and (c); desig-
1987, ch. 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21. nated the existing provision in Subsection (4) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- as present Subsection (4)(a), adding "In an ad-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted judicative proceeding begun by a party that 
"properly scheduled hearing afler receiving has other parties besides the party in default," 
proper notice" for "hearing" in Subsection and added Subsection (b); and made minor sty-
(l)(b); designated the existing provisions in listic changes. 
Subsection (3) as present Subsection (3)(a), in- Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
serting "and any order in the adjudicative pro- § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
ceeding issued subsequent to the default or- 1988. 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity desig-
nated for that purpose by the statute or rale. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within 
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the 
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties 
and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the 
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the 
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the 
agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule 
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other 
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or appli-
cable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on 
review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a 
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring re-
view; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be 
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
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(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in writing to an extension, if 
an agency has not issued a declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of 
the petition for a declaratory order, the petition is denied. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-21, enacted by L. a declaratory order" for "request for a declara-
1987, ch. 161, § 277; 1988, ch. 72, § 27. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted 
"Section 63-46b-9" for "Section 63-46b-10" in 
Subsection (4)(a) and substituted "petition for 
tory order" in Subsection (7). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1988. 
63-46b-22. Transition procedures. 
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review 
contained in this chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings 
commenced by or before an agency on and after January 1, 1988. 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial 
review that are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or before December 31, 
1987, even if those proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on 
January 1, 1988. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-22, enacted by L. 
1987 (1st S.S.), eh. 5, § 1. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 
5, § 2 makes the act effective on June 3, 1987. 
CHAPTER 47 
COMMISSION ON STATUS OF WOMEN 
Section 
63-47-1. Creation — Purpose. 
63-47-2. Members — Appointment — Terms 
— Vacancies. 
63-47-3. Qualifications of members. 
63-47-4. Election of chairman — Meetings. 
63-47-5. Duties. 
63-47-1. Creation — Purpos 
Section 
63-47-6 
63-47-7. 
63-47-8 
e. 
Administrative assistant — Ap-
pointment of personnel. 
Authority to accept funds, gifts, and 
donations. 
Enactment of bylaws and rules. 
There is hereby established the Governor's Commission on the Status of 
Women. The purpose of the commission shall be to advise and confer with the 
governor and state agencies concerning issues of importance to women and 
families in Utah and to serve as a contact and co-ordinating group to analyze 
state and local programs to determine whether they adequately serve women 
and protect the rights of men, women and families. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 173, § 1. 
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, $ 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25. 63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection (l)(a) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
that final agency action from informal adjudi- § 315
 m akes the act effective on January 1, 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1988. 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. the district court will no longer function as in-
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63«46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pel late court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, efTective April 25, 1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb). 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Court of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or
 § 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1, 
other appellate court designated by statute" in j^gg 
Subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme § 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis- (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-17, Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch. 161, § 273. 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
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